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Aug 25

How Agent Skills Fail under Long Contexts: A White-Box Study in Code Auditing

Agent Skills package procedural instructions and checks for use by general-purpose agents, but loading a skill does not guarantee that every requirement remains active throughout a long tool-using trajectory. We study this problem in a production-derived, white-box code-audit workflow. Holding the task and 24 artifact checks fixed, we vary the surrounding context and classify where failures first become visible: lost requirements, editing drift, failed checking, or non-agent evaluator/runtime failures. Codex with gpt-5.4-mini passes 8/10 runs in a 10,991-character clean context but only 3/10 in both a 299,140-character relevant context and an equal-length irrelevant context. This 50-percentage-point difference is large but remains trend-level under two-sided Fisher tests (p = 0.0698). Requirement coverage nevertheless stays above 92% in both long conditions, showing that a few omissions can invalidate an otherwise complete artifact. A second task passes all clean and long runs, so the evidence does not support a universal context-length threshold. A detailed external checklist passes 10/10 runs, compared with 5/10 for a generic self-check (p = 0.0325). Coding-agent scaffolds may help by selecting a smaller working set, but they do not eliminate failures. We do not introduce context rot or a new general monitoring method; we provide a bounded failure classification and empirical case study for white-box code auditing.

  • 1 authors
·
Jul 19

Token-Flow Firewall: Semantic Runtime Auditing for Persistent AI Agents

Persistent AI agents extend large language models (LLMs) beyond single-turn interaction into long-lived software systems. Unlike traditional chat assistants, unsafe content in these agents can propagate through persistent state, reusable skills, and tool-mediated interactions, creating a substantially larger semantic attack surface. We observe that most security-critical interactions in such agents are transmitted through natural-language token flows, including memory updates, tool arguments, retrieved files, and inter-component communications. This observation enables a new security formulation: unsafe behavior can be intercepted as risky semantic flows before reaching privileged runtime sinks. Based on this insight, we propose TokenWall, a runtime defense framework that acts as a semantic firewall over agent token flows. TokenWall performs boundary-aware semantic auditing over these flows, constructing structured source-sink audit records, applying lightweight local inspection before execution, and selectively escalating ambiguous high-risk cases to stronger arbitration modules. Unlike prior approaches that rely on sparse auditing or remote large-model oversight, TokenWall enables full-coverage pre-execution mediation while reducing remote arbitration and latency. Experiments on CIK-Bench show that TokenWall reduces attack success rate to 12.5% while maintaining a 97.4% benign executable pass rate without human confirmation. TokenWall further introduces only 0.69 seconds of additional latency on benign cases, demonstrating that semantic runtime containment can achieve a practical security-utility trade-off for persistent AI agents.

  • 5 authors
·
Jul 8

Bias in the Loop: Auditing LLM-as-a-Judge for Software Engineering

Large Language Models are increasingly used as judges to evaluate code artifacts when exhaustive human review or executable test coverage is unavailable. LLM-judge is increasingly relevant in agentic software engineering workflows, where it can help rank candidate solutions and guide patch selection. While attractive for scale, current practice lacks a principled account of reliability and bias: repeated evaluations of the same case can disagree; small prompt edits can swing outcomes; and seemingly semantics-preserving, human-equivalent perturbations may elicit divergent verdicts. This paper studies LLM-as-a-Judge for code through a measurement-first lens. We analyze two pointwise judging regimes across code generation, code repair task, and test generation, and we systematically probe prompt-induced biases. Our study considers difficulty levels for repeated runs and controlled prompt interventions that isolate one presentation cue at a time, and it evaluates judges using consistency and sensitivity to bias. We find that judge decisions are highly sensitive to prompt biases even when the underlying code snippet is unchanged. Across all three tasks, several biases systematically shift preferences toward the option favored by the prompt, improving accuracy when that option aligns with the gold answer but substantially reducing it otherwise. In some settings, these effects are large enough to change task-level conclusions and alter relative model rankings. These findings show that reported judge performance may reflect prompt artifacts rather than stable assessment ability, posing a direct threat to the validity and reproducibility of code evaluation. We therefore argue that LLM-as-a-Judge studies should report bias sensitivity alongside accuracy and incorporate explicit controls to support more trustworthy model comparison in software engineering.

  • 3 authors
·
Apr 17

The Surprising Effectiveness of Membership Inference with Simple N-Gram Coverage

Membership inference attacks serves as useful tool for fair use of language models, such as detecting potential copyright infringement and auditing data leakage. However, many current state-of-the-art attacks require access to models' hidden states or probability distribution, which prevents investigation into more widely-used, API-access only models like GPT-4. In this work, we introduce N-Gram Coverage Attack, a membership inference attack that relies solely on text outputs from the target model, enabling attacks on completely black-box models. We leverage the observation that models are more likely to memorize and subsequently generate text patterns that were commonly observed in their training data. Specifically, to make a prediction on a candidate member, N-Gram Coverage Attack first obtains multiple model generations conditioned on a prefix of the candidate. It then uses n-gram overlap metrics to compute and aggregate the similarities of these outputs with the ground truth suffix; high similarities indicate likely membership. We first demonstrate on a diverse set of existing benchmarks that N-Gram Coverage Attack outperforms other black-box methods while also impressively achieving comparable or even better performance to state-of-the-art white-box attacks - despite having access to only text outputs. Interestingly, we find that the success rate of our method scales with the attack compute budget - as we increase the number of sequences generated from the target model conditioned on the prefix, attack performance tends to improve. Having verified the accuracy of our method, we use it to investigate previously unstudied closed OpenAI models on multiple domains. We find that more recent models, such as GPT-4o, exhibit increased robustness to membership inference, suggesting an evolving trend toward improved privacy protections.

  • 10 authors
·
Aug 13, 2025 1

T2I-BiasBench: A Multi-Metric Framework for Auditing Demographic and Cultural Bias in Text-to-Image Models

Text-to-image (T2I) generative models achieve impressive visual fidelity but inherit and amplify demographic imbalances and cultural biases embedded in training data. We introduce T2I-BiasBench, a unified evaluation framework of thirteen complementary metrics that jointly captures demographic bias, element omission, and cultural collapse in diffusion models - the first framework to address all three dimensions simultaneously. We evaluate three open-source models - Stable Diffusion v1.5, BK-SDM Base, and Koala Lightning - against Gemini 2.5 Flash (RLHF-aligned) as a reference baseline. The benchmark comprises 1,574 generated images across five structured prompt categories. T2I-BiasBench integrates six established metrics with seven additional measures: four newly proposed (Composite Bias Score, Grounded Missing Rate, Implicit Element Missing Rate, Cultural Accuracy Ratio) and three adapted (Hallucination Score, Vendi Score, CLIP Proxy Score). Three key findings emerge: (1) Stable Diffusion v1.5 and BK-SDM exhibit bias amplification (>1.0) in beauty-related prompts; (2) contextual constraints such as surgical PPE substantially attenuate professional-role gender bias (Doctor CBS = 0.06 for SD v1.5); and (3) all models, including RLHF-aligned Gemini, collapse to a narrow set of cultural representations (CAS: 0.54-1.00), confirming that alignment techniques do not resolve cultural coverage gaps. T2I-BiasBench is publicly released to support standardized, fine-grained bias evaluation of generative models. The project page is available at: https://gyanendrachaubey.github.io/T2I-BiasBench/

  • 6 authors
·
Apr 13

Super Research: Answering Highly Complex Questions with Large Language Models through Super Deep and Super Wide Research

While Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated proficiency in Deep Research or Wide Search, their capacity to solve highly complex questions-those requiring long-horizon planning, massive evidence gathering, and synthesis across heterogeneous sources-remains largely unexplored. We introduce Super Research, a task for complex autonomous research tasks that integrates (i) structured decomposition into a research plan, (ii) super wide retrieval for diverse perspectives, and (iii) super deep investigation to resolve uncertainties through iterative queries. To evaluate this capability, we curated a benchmark of 300 expert-written questions across diverse domains, each requiring up to 100+ retrieval steps and 1,000+ web pages to reconcile conflicting evidence. Super Research produces verifiable reports with fine-grained citations and intermediate artifacts (e.g., outlines and tables) to ensure traceable reasoning. Furthermore, we present a graph-anchored auditing protocol that evaluates Super Research along five dimensions: Coverage, Logical Consistency, Report Utility, Objectivity and Citation Health. While super-complex questions may be infrequent in standard applications, Super Research serves as a critical ceiling evaluation and stress test for LLM capabilities. A model's proficiency within Super Research acts as a powerful proxy for its general research competence; success here suggests the robustness necessary to navigate nearly any subordinate research task. Leaderboard is available at: https://cnsdqd-dyb.github.io/Super-Research-Benchmark/

  • 8 authors
·
Mar 2

ESAA-Security: An Event-Sourced, Verifiable Architecture for Agent-Assisted Security Audits of AI-Generated Code

AI-assisted software generation has increased development speed, but it has also amplified a persistent engineering problem: systems that are functionally correct may still be structurally insecure. In practice, prompt-based security review with large language models often suffers from uneven coverage, weak reproducibility, unsupported findings, and the absence of an immutable audit trail. The ESAA architecture addresses a related governance problem in agentic software engineering by separating heuristic agent cognition from deterministic state mutation through append-only events, constrained outputs, and replay-based verification. This paper presents ESAA-Security, a domain-specific specialization of ESAA for agent-assisted security auditing of software repositories, with particular emphasis on AI-generated or AI-modified code. ESAA-Security structures auditing as a governed execution pipeline with four phases reconnaissance, domain audit execution, risk classification, and final reporting and operationalizes the workflow into 26 tasks, 16 security domains, and 95 executable checks. The framework produces structured check results, vulnerability inventories, severity classifications, risk matrices, remediation guidance, executive summaries, and a final markdown/JSON audit report. The central idea is that security review should not be modeled as a free-form conversation with an LLM, but as an evidence-oriented audit process governed by contracts and events. In ESAA-Security, agents emit structured intentions under constrained protocols; the orchestrator validates them, persists accepted outputs to an append-only log, reprojects derived views, and verifies consistency through replay and hashing. The result is a traceable, reproducible, and risk-oriented audit architecture whose final report is auditable by construction.

  • 1 authors
·
Mar 5

Who Audits the Auditors? Recommendations from a field scan of the algorithmic auditing ecosystem

AI audits are an increasingly popular mechanism for algorithmic accountability; however, they remain poorly defined. Without a clear understanding of audit practices, let alone widely used standards or regulatory guidance, claims that an AI product or system has been audited, whether by first-, second-, or third-party auditors, are difficult to verify and may exacerbate, rather than mitigate, bias and harm. To address this knowledge gap, we provide the first comprehensive field scan of the AI audit ecosystem. We share a catalog of individuals (N=438) and organizations (N=189) who engage in algorithmic audits or whose work is directly relevant to algorithmic audits; conduct an anonymous survey of the group (N=152); and interview industry leaders (N=10). We identify emerging best practices as well as methods and tools that are becoming commonplace, and enumerate common barriers to leveraging algorithmic audits as effective accountability mechanisms. We outline policy recommendations to improve the quality and impact of these audits, and highlight proposals with wide support from algorithmic auditors as well as areas of debate. Our recommendations have implications for lawmakers, regulators, internal company policymakers, and standards-setting bodies, as well as for auditors. They are: 1) require the owners and operators of AI systems to engage in independent algorithmic audits against clearly defined standards; 2) notify individuals when they are subject to algorithmic decision-making systems; 3) mandate disclosure of key components of audit findings for peer review; 4) consider real-world harm in the audit process, including through standardized harm incident reporting and response mechanisms; 5) directly involve the stakeholders most likely to be harmed by AI systems in the algorithmic audit process; and 6) formalize evaluation and, potentially, accreditation of algorithmic auditors.

  • 5 authors
·
Oct 3, 2023

Fairness is in the details: Face Dataset Auditing

Auditing involves verifying the proper implementation of a given policy. As such, auditing is essential for ensuring compliance with the principles of fairness, equity, and transparency mandated by the European Union's AI Act. Moreover, biases present during the training phase of a learning system can persist in the modeling process and result in discrimination against certain subgroups of individuals when the model is deployed in production. Assessing bias in image datasets is a particularly complex task, as it first requires a feature extraction step, then to consider the extraction's quality in the statistical tests. This paper proposes a robust methodology for auditing image datasets based on so-called "sensitive" features, such as gender, age, and ethnicity. The proposed methodology consists of both a feature extraction phase and a statistical analysis phase. The first phase introduces a novel convolutional neural network (CNN) architecture specifically designed for extracting sensitive features with a limited number of manual annotations. The second phase compares the distributions of sensitive features across subgroups using a novel statistical test that accounts for the imprecision of the feature extraction model. Our pipeline constitutes a comprehensive and fully automated methodology for dataset auditing. We illustrate our approach using two manually annotated datasets. The code and datasets are available at github.com/ValentinLafargue/FairnessDetails.

MedSkillAudit: A Domain-Specific Audit Framework for Medical Research Agent Skills

Background: Agent skills are increasingly deployed as modular, reusable capability units in AI agent systems. Medical research agent skills require safeguards beyond general-purpose evaluation, including scientific integrity, methodological validity, reproducibility, and boundary safety. This study developed and preliminarily evaluated a domain-specific audit framework for medical research agent skills, with a focus on reliability against expert review. Methods: We developed MedSkillAudit ([email protected]), a layered framework assessing skill release readiness before deployment. We evaluated 75 skills across five medical research categories (15 per category). Two experts independently assigned a quality score (0-100), an ordinal release disposition (Production Ready / Limited Release / Beta Only / Reject), and a high-risk failure flag. System-expert agreement was quantified using ICC(2,1) and linearly weighted Cohen's kappa, benchmarked against the human inter-rater baseline. Results: The mean consensus quality score was 72.4 (SD = 13.0); 57.3% of skills fell below the Limited Release threshold. MedSkillAudit achieved ICC(2,1) = 0.449 (95% CI: 0.250-0.610), exceeding the human inter-rater ICC of 0.300. System-consensus score divergence (SD = 9.5) was smaller than inter-expert divergence (SD = 12.4), with no directional bias (Wilcoxon p = 0.613). Protocol Design showed the strongest category-level agreement (ICC = 0.551); Academic Writing showed a negative ICC (-0.567), reflecting a structural rubric-expert mismatch. Conclusions: Domain-specific pre-deployment audit may provide a practical foundation for governing medical research agent skills, complementing general-purpose quality checks with structured audit workflows tailored to scientific use cases.

AIPOCH-AI AIPOCH
·
Apr 21 2

Exposing the Illusion of Fairness: Auditing Vulnerabilities to Distributional Manipulation Attacks

The rapid deployment of AI systems in high-stakes domains, including those classified as high-risk under the The EU AI Act (Regulation (EU) 2024/1689), has intensified the need for reliable compliance auditing. For binary classifiers, regulatory risk assessment often relies on global fairness metrics such as the Disparate Impact ratio, widely used to evaluate potential discrimination. In typical auditing settings, the auditee provides a subset of its dataset to an auditor, while a supervisory authority may verify whether this subset is representative of the full underlying distribution. In this work, we investigate to what extent a malicious auditee can construct a fairness-compliant yet representative-looking sample from a non-compliant original distribution, thereby creating an illusion of fairness. We formalize this problem as a constrained distributional projection task and introduce mathematically grounded manipulation strategies based on entropic and optimal transport projections. These constructions characterize the minimal distributional shift required to satisfy fairness constraints. To counter such attacks, we formalize representativeness through distributional distance based statistical tests and systematically evaluate their ability to detect manipulated samples. Our analysis highlights the conditions under which fairness manipulation can remain statistically undetected and provides practical guidelines for strengthening supervisory verification. We validate our theoretical findings through experiments on standard tabular datasets for bias detection. Code is publicly available at https://github.com/ValentinLafargue/Inspection.

When No Benchmark Exists: Validating Comparative LLM Safety Scoring Without Ground-Truth Labels

Many deployments must compare candidate language models for safety before a labeled benchmark exists for the relevant language, sector, or regulatory regime. We formalize this setting as benchmarkless comparative safety scoring and specify the contract under which a scenario-based audit can be interpreted as deployment evidence. Scores are valid only under a fixed scenario pack, rubric, auditor, judge, sampling configuration, and rerun budget. Because no labels are available, we replace ground-truth agreement with an instrumental-validity chain: responsiveness to a controlled safe-versus-abliterated contrast, dominance of target-driven variance over auditor and judge artifacts, and stability across reruns. We instantiate the chain in SimpleAudit, a local-first scoring instrument, and validate it on a Norwegian safety pack. Safe and abliterated targets separate with AUROC values between 0.89 and 1.00, target identity is the dominant variance component (η^2 approx 0.52), and severity profiles stabilize by ten reruns. Applying the same chain to Petri shows that it admits both tools. The substantial differences arise upstream of the chain, in claim-contract enforcement and deployment fit. A Norwegian public-sector procurement case comparing Borealis and Gemma 3 demonstrates the resulting evidence in practice: the safer model depends on scenario category and risk measure. Consequently, scores, matched deltas, critical rates, uncertainty, and the auditor and judge used must be reported together rather than collapsed into a single ranking.

ScientistOne: Towards Human-Level Autonomous Research via Chain-of-Evidence

Autonomous research agents produce competitive solutions and professional-looking manuscripts, yet their outputs contain verifiability failures undetectable by surface-level evaluation: fabricated citations, unreproducible scores, and method descriptions that diverge from the implementation. We address this through three contributions. First, Chain-of-Evidence (CoE), a verifiability framework requiring every claim to be traceable to its evidence source. Second, ScientistOne, an end-to-end autonomous research system that maintains evidence chains by construction throughout literature review, solution discovery, and paper writing. Third, CoE Audit, a post-hoc audit whose four integrity checks -- score verification, specification violation, reference verification, and method-code alignment -- apply uniformly to all systems. Across 75 papers spanning five systems and five frontier research tasks, every baseline exhibits at least one systematic failure mode: hallucinated reference rates reach 21%, score verification passes in as few as 42% of papers, and method-code alignment ranges from 20% to 80%. ScientistOne achieves zero hallucinated references (0/337), perfect score verification (12/12), and the highest method-code alignment (14/15), while matching or exceeding human expert performance on all five tasks. ScientistOne further generalizes to six additional tasks spanning medical imaging, fine-grained recognition, 3D perception, and language modeling, achieving state-of-the-art on Parameter Golf and gold medals on MLE-Bench tasks where baselines fail entirely.

google Google
·
May 24 2

Auditing and Generating Synthetic Data with Controllable Trust Trade-offs

Data collected from the real world tends to be biased, unbalanced, and at risk of exposing sensitive and private information. This reality has given rise to the idea of creating synthetic datasets to alleviate risk, bias, harm, and privacy concerns inherent in the real data. This concept relies on Generative AI models to produce unbiased, privacy-preserving synthetic data while being true to the real data. In this new paradigm, how can we tell if this approach delivers on its promises? We present an auditing framework that offers a holistic assessment of synthetic datasets and AI models trained on them, centered around bias and discrimination prevention, fidelity to the real data, utility, robustness, and privacy preservation. We showcase our framework by auditing multiple generative models on diverse use cases, including education, healthcare, banking, human resources, and across different modalities, from tabular, to time-series, to natural language. Our use cases demonstrate the importance of a holistic assessment in order to ensure compliance with socio-technical safeguards that regulators and policymakers are increasingly enforcing. For this purpose, we introduce the trust index that ranks multiple synthetic datasets based on their prescribed safeguards and their desired trade-offs. Moreover, we devise a trust-index-driven model selection and cross-validation procedure via auditing in the training loop that we showcase on a class of transformer models that we dub TrustFormers, across different modalities. This trust-driven model selection allows for controllable trust trade-offs in the resulting synthetic data. We instrument our auditing framework with workflows that connect different stakeholders from model development to audit and certification via a synthetic data auditing report.

  • 14 authors
·
Apr 21, 2023

Gym-Anything: Turn any Software into an Agent Environment

Computer-use agents hold the promise of assisting in a wide range of digital economic activities. However, current research has largely focused on short-horizon tasks over a limited set of software with limited economic value, such as basic e-commerce and OS-configuration tasks. A key reason is that creating environments for complex software requires significant time and human effort, and therefore does not scale. To address this, we introduce Gym-Anything, a framework for converting any software into an interactive computer-use environment. We frame environment creation itself as a multi-agent task: a coding agent writes setup scripts, downloads real-world data, and configures the software, while producing evidence of correct setup. An independent audit agent then verifies evidence for the environment setup against a quality checklist. Using a taxonomy of economically valuable occupations grounded in U.S. GDP data, we apply this pipeline to 200 software applications with broad occupational coverage. The result is CUA-World, a collection of over 10K long-horizon tasks spanning domains from medical science and astronomy to engineering and enterprise systems, each configured with realistic data along with train and test splits. CUA-World also includes CUA-World-Long, a challenging long-horizon benchmark with tasks often requiring over 500 steps, far exceeding existing benchmarks. Distilling successful trajectories from the training split into a 2B vision-language model outperforms models 2times its size. We also apply the same auditing principle at test time: a separate VLM reviews completed trajectories and provides feedback on what remains, improving Gemini-3-Flash on CUA-World-Long from 11.5% to 14.0%. We release all code, infrastructure, and benchmark data to facilitate future research in realistic computer-use agents.

  • 3 authors
·
Apr 6

What AI Red-Team Evaluations Can and Cannot Prove

Red-team evaluations of AI models support some claims and not others, and the boundary between the two is calculable rather than merely a matter of judgment. We define the evidential ceiling of an evaluation as the largest factor by which one result can move belief under a fixed testing budget, derive it in closed form for the benchmark null result, and use it to locate that boundary exactly. We find that above a calculable harm rate, a benchmark of modest size certifies a category to a stated evidentiary standard, and a clean sheet is then the stronger of the two possible observations, outweighing a single reproduced failure. Below that rate, no passive benchmark of feasible size provides the specified evidence of safety under the fixed scoring rule and approximately independent trial structure. The crossing between the two regimes has a closed form. The bound is not specific to benchmarks: written in terms of a procedure's hypothesis conditioned elicitation rates, it covers adaptive and automated red teaming as well, and shows that discrimination between the hypotheses rather than attack success is what determines evidential worth. Auditing eight evaluation suites against the boundary, we find that current benchmarks are adequate for high-frequency harm categories and several orders of magnitude short for rare, catastrophic ones. Safety benchmarks are not uninformative. They are informative about a specific and computable set of propositions, and the discipline they need is to state which.

apisec apisec
·
Jul 22 2

Jurisdiction as Structural Barrier: How Privacy Policy Organization May Reduce Visibility of Substantive Disclosures

Privacy policies are supposed to provide notice. But what if substantive information appears only where users skip it? We identify a structural pattern we call jurisdiction-siloed disclosure: information about data practices appearing in specific, actionable form only within regional compliance sections labeled "California Residents" or "EU/UK Users," while general sections use vague or qualified language for the same practices. Our audit of 123 major companies identifies 282 potential instances across 77 companies (62.6% of this purposive sample). A conservative estimate restricted to practice categories validated against OPP-115 human annotations finds 138 instances across 54 companies (44%); post-2018 categories central to our findings await independent validation. If users skip jurisdiction-labeled sections as information foraging theory predicts, users outside regulated jurisdictions would receive less specific information about practices affecting them--a transparency failure operating through document architecture rather than omission. We propose universal substantive disclosure: practices affecting all users should appear in the main policy body, with regional sections containing only procedural rights information. This standard finds support in analogous disclosure regimes (securities, truth-in-lending, nutritional labeling) where material information must reach all affected parties. Regulators could operationalize this through the FTC's "clear and conspicuous" standard and GDPR transparency principles. This work is hypothesis-generating: we establish that the structural pattern exists and ground the transparency concern in behavioral theory, but direct measurement of jurisdiction-specific section skipping remains the critical validation priority. We release our methodology and annotated dataset to enable replication.

  • 1 authors
·
Jan 28

ARIS: Autonomous Research via Adversarial Multi-Agent Collaboration

This report describes ARIS (Auto-Research-in-sleep), an open-source research harness for autonomous research, including its architecture, assurance mechanisms, and early deployment experience. The performance of agent systems built on LLMs depends on both the model weights and the harness around them, which governs what information to store, retrieve, and present to the model. For long-horizon research workflows, the central failure mode is not a visible breakdown but a plausible unsupported success: a long-running agent can produce claims whose evidential support is incomplete, misreported, or silently inherited from the executor's framing. Therefore, we present ARIS as a research harness that coordinates machine-learning research workflows through cross-model adversarial collaboration as a default configuration: an executor model drives forward progress while a reviewer from a different model family is recommended to critique intermediate artifacts and request revisions. ARIS has three architectural layers. The execution layer provides more than 65 reusable Markdown-defined skills, model integrations via MCP, a persistent research wiki for iterative reuse of prior findings, and deterministic figure generation. The orchestration layer coordinates five end-to-end workflows with adjustable effort settings and configurable routing to reviewer models. The assurance layer includes a three-stage process for checking whether experimental claims are supported by evidence: integrity verification, result-to-claim mapping, and claim auditing that cross-checks manuscript statements against the claim ledger and raw evidence, as well as a five-pass scientific-editing pipeline, mathematical-proof checks, and visual inspection of the rendered PDF. A prototype self-improvement loop records research traces and proposes harness improvements that are adopted only after reviewer approval.

AuditLLM: A Tool for Auditing Large Language Models Using Multiprobe Approach

As Large Language Models (LLMs) gain wider adoption in various contexts, it becomes crucial to ensure they are reasonably safe, consistent, and reliable for an application at hand. This may require probing or auditing them. Probing LLMs with varied iterations of a single question could reveal potential inconsistencies in their knowledge or functionality. However, a tool for performing such audits with simple workflow and low technical threshold is lacking. In this demo, we introduce "AuditLLM," a novel tool designed to evaluate the performance of various LLMs in a methodical way. AuditLLM's core functionality lies in its ability to test a given LLM by auditing it using multiple probes generated from a single question, thereby identifying any inconsistencies in the model's understanding or operation. A reasonably robust, reliable, and consistent LLM should output semantically similar responses for a question asked differently or by different people. Based on this assumption, AuditLLM produces easily interpretable results regarding the LLM's consistencies from a single question that the user enters. A certain level of inconsistency has been shown to be an indicator of potential bias, hallucinations, and other issues. One could then use the output of AuditLLM to further investigate issues with the aforementioned LLM. To facilitate demonstration and practical uses, AuditLLM offers two key modes: (1) Live mode which allows instant auditing of LLMs by analyzing responses to real-time queries; (2) Batch mode which facilitates comprehensive LLM auditing by processing multiple queries at once for in-depth analysis. This tool is beneficial for both researchers and general users, as it enhances our understanding of LLMs' capabilities in generating responses, using a standardized auditing platform.

  • 4 authors
·
Feb 14, 2024

LLMAuditor: A Framework for Auditing Large Language Models Using Human-in-the-Loop

As Large Language Models (LLMs) become more pervasive across various users and scenarios, identifying potential issues when using these models becomes essential. Examples of such issues include: bias, inconsistencies, and hallucination. Although auditing the LLM for these problems is often warranted, such a process is neither easy nor accessible for most. An effective method is to probe the LLM using different versions of the same question. This could expose inconsistencies in its knowledge or operation, indicating potential for bias or hallucination. However, to operationalize this auditing method at scale, we need an approach to create those probes reliably and automatically. In this paper we propose the LLMAuditor framework which is an automatic, and scalable solution, where one uses a different LLM along with human-in-the-loop (HIL). This approach offers verifiability and transparency, while avoiding circular reliance on the same LLM, and increasing scientific rigor and generalizability. Specifically, LLMAuditor includes two phases of verification using humans: standardized evaluation criteria to verify responses, and a structured prompt template to generate desired probes. A case study using questions from the TruthfulQA dataset demonstrates that we can generate a reliable set of probes from one LLM that can be used to audit inconsistencies in a different LLM. This process is enhanced by our structured prompt template with HIL, which not only boosts the reliability of our approach in auditing but also yields the delivery of less hallucinated results. The novelty of our research stems from the development of a comprehensive, general-purpose framework that includes a HIL verified prompt template for auditing responses generated by LLMs.

  • 7 authors
·
Feb 14, 2024

Channel Location Constrains the Auditability of Subliminal Learning

Subliminal learning lets a student inherit a teacher's hidden trait from distillation data that never names it. We ask when such transfer can be audited before training. The answer is not model identity or scale alone, but channel location: the carrier through which the trait reaches the student. We find three regimes. In a controlled initialization-dependent body channel, a pre-training screen works. Coverage, the cosine between the student's initial distillation update and the teacher's fine-tuning displacement, predicts held-out transfer (Spearman ρapprox 0.95; AUROC 0.997). In pretrained language models, masked single-token traits instead ride convergent vocabulary geometry. This channel is initialization-independent, so initialization-alignment screens, including coverage, are not mechanistic; the useful handles are post-hoc detection and targeted mitigation. Even when a single-token named entity is removed from the loss, the student's held-out probability for that entity rises to 0.40 on average (sim 2500times), and a related semantic class transfers. In an untied-head model, orthogonalizing the trait's output row against entangled neighbours collapses leakage, while equal-size random-subspace edits do not. Thus removing a target string from distillation labels does not remove the corresponding preference: neighbouring tokens can carry it. Finally, conditional behaviours can route through the network body. For sycophancy, with agreement and correction markers masked from the loss, transfer reaches about 0.63 of the teacher's effect, localizes to body computation, and evades four audits across two model families. We scope this as masked transfer of a condition-present policy. Channel location is necessary for deciding which audits can be sound. It is not a deployment-ready screen: an audit used outside its carrier regime can give false assurance.

  • 1 authors
·
Jun 19

AuditBench: Evaluating Alignment Auditing Techniques on Models with Hidden Behaviors

We introduce AuditBench, an alignment auditing benchmark. AuditBench consists of 56 language models with implanted hidden behaviors. Each model has one of 14 concerning behaviors--such as sycophantic deference, opposition to AI regulation, or secret geopolitical loyalties--which it does not confess to when directly asked. AuditBench models are highly diverse--some are subtle, while others are overt, and we use varying training techniques both for implanting behaviors and training models not to confess. To demonstrate AuditBench's utility, we develop an investigator agent that autonomously employs a configurable set of auditing tools. By measuring investigator agent success using different tools, we can evaluate their efficacy. Notably, we observe a tool-to-agent gap, where tools that perform well in standalone non-agentic evaluations fail to translate into improved performance when used with our investigator agent. We find that our most effective tools involve scaffolded calls to auxiliary models that generate diverse prompts for the target. White-box interpretability tools can be helpful, but the agent performs best with black-box tools. We also find that audit success varies greatly across training techniques: models trained on synthetic documents are easier to audit than models trained on demonstrations, with better adversarial training further increasing auditing difficulty. We release our models, agent, and evaluation framework to support future quantitative, iterative science on alignment auditing.

  • 8 authors
·
Mar 8

Ventor-QTest: Threat-Model-Driven Verification of Vendor-Hosted LLM APIs

As large language models become increasingly widespread, third-party providers that deploy open-weight models have become an important part of the ecosystem. Auditing the quality of their inference APIs is therefore an open problem. We formalize hosted model routing as a stochastic process and propose \textbf{Ventor-QTest}, a composite black-box audit that requires no probability information from the target API. Its repeated-request component sends each frozen constrained context to the target multiple times, reconstructs a categorical output distribution from the returned text counts, and reports average fidelity loss (AFL) as a null-bias-corrected, within-window mean coarsened-KL statistic. Its long-sequence component uses independent runs to report extreme fidelity loss (EFL) through the empirical upper tail of a run-level reference-centered-surprisal statistic. Across three logprob-capable route conditions, AFL shows strong linear descriptive agreement with a logprob-derived coarsened-KL comparator. Across seven route snapshots, 20-run sequence probes reveal route-specific EFL variation. AFL and EFL have little detectable route-level association with GPQA-Diamond accuracy. In contrast, pronounced EFL coincides with a decline in Terminal-Bench pass rate as task exposure increases. This pattern may arise because correctness in long-horizon tasks is more sensitive to extreme fidelity loss. These results motivate reporting AFL and EFL jointly, particularly when auditing long-horizon agentic tasks. The open-source implementation is available at https://github.com/Tencent/AI-Infra-Guard/tree/main/services/api_checker/ventor_qtest.

tencent Tencent
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Aug 16 2

Demographically-Conditioned Synthetic Medical Images for Bias Mitigation and Bias Detection in Disease Classifiers

Per-subgroup fairness audits of medical image classifiers face a sample-size problem: minority subgroups in held-out test sets have so few samples that the resulting confidence intervals on per-subgroup performance are wider than the bias the audit is meant to detect. We argue that a demographically-conditioned synthetic generator can do both: mitigate bias on the training side and detect bias on the evaluation side. Working on COVID-19 chest CT classification with an end-to-end fine-tuned Stable Diffusion 2.1 generator, we make two findings. For bias mitigation (training), a demographically-balanced synthetic cohort is most useful as a pretraining prior, not as joint augmentation: with the same fixed data, sequential pretraining followed by fine-tuning substantially outperforms joint augmentation, and the resulting classifier surpasses the full-real baseline at sim100times real-data efficiency. For bias detection (evaluation), across five synthetic minority cohorts and five classifier seeds, the synthetic estimator reproduces the subgroup ranking of a well-powered real oracle (Spearman ρ= 1.00 on MCC and Recall) and gives the more reliable per-cell estimate where the small real test set runs out of samples. The synthetic cohort is therefore most useful in exactly the cells that fairness audits care about, as both a fix for and a measure of subgroup bias.

  • 5 authors
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Jul 15

Advancing Software Quality: A Standards-Focused Review of LLM-Based Assurance Techniques

Software Quality Assurance (SQA) is critical for delivering reliable, secure, and efficient software products. The Software Quality Assurance Process aims to provide assurance that work products and processes comply with predefined provisions and plans. Recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) present new opportunities to enhance existing SQA processes by automating tasks like requirement analysis, code review, test generation, and compliance checks. Simultaneously, established standards such as ISO/IEC 12207, ISO/IEC 25010, ISO/IEC 5055, ISO 9001/ISO/IEC 90003, CMMI, and TMM provide structured frameworks for ensuring robust quality practices. This paper surveys the intersection of LLM-based SQA methods and these recognized standards, highlighting how AI-driven solutions can augment traditional approaches while maintaining compliance and process maturity. We first review the foundational software quality standards and the technical fundamentals of LLMs in software engineering. Next, we explore various LLM-based SQA applications, including requirement validation, defect detection, test generation, and documentation maintenance. We then map these applications to key software quality frameworks, illustrating how LLMs can address specific requirements and metrics within each standard. Empirical case studies and open-source initiatives demonstrate the practical viability of these methods. At the same time, discussions on challenges (e.g., data privacy, model bias, explainability) underscore the need for deliberate governance and auditing. Finally, we propose future directions encompassing adaptive learning, privacy-focused deployments, multimodal analysis, and evolving standards for AI-driven software quality.

  • 1 authors
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May 19, 2025

Large Language Model-Powered Smart Contract Vulnerability Detection: New Perspectives

This paper provides a systematic analysis of the opportunities, challenges, and potential solutions of harnessing Large Language Models (LLMs) such as GPT-4 to dig out vulnerabilities within smart contracts based on our ongoing research. For the task of smart contract vulnerability detection, achieving practical usability hinges on identifying as many true vulnerabilities as possible while minimizing the number of false positives. Nonetheless, our empirical study reveals contradictory yet interesting findings: generating more answers with higher randomness largely boosts the likelihood of producing a correct answer but inevitably leads to a higher number of false positives. To mitigate this tension, we propose an adversarial framework dubbed GPTLens that breaks the conventional one-stage detection into two synergistic stages - generation and discrimination, for progressive detection and refinement, wherein the LLM plays dual roles, i.e., auditor and critic, respectively. The goal of auditor is to yield a broad spectrum of vulnerabilities with the hope of encompassing the correct answer, whereas the goal of critic that evaluates the validity of identified vulnerabilities is to minimize the number of false positives. Experimental results and illustrative examples demonstrate that auditor and critic work together harmoniously to yield pronounced improvements over the conventional one-stage detection. GPTLens is intuitive, strategic, and entirely LLM-driven without relying on specialist expertise in smart contracts, showcasing its methodical generality and potential to detect a broad spectrum of vulnerabilities. Our code is available at: https://github.com/git-disl/GPTLens.

  • 5 authors
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Oct 2, 2023

Individually Fair Learning with One-Sided Feedback

We consider an online learning problem with one-sided feedback, in which the learner is able to observe the true label only for positively predicted instances. On each round, k instances arrive and receive classification outcomes according to a randomized policy deployed by the learner, whose goal is to maximize accuracy while deploying individually fair policies. We first extend the framework of Bechavod et al. (2020), which relies on the existence of a human fairness auditor for detecting fairness violations, to instead incorporate feedback from dynamically-selected panels of multiple, possibly inconsistent, auditors. We then construct an efficient reduction from our problem of online learning with one-sided feedback and a panel reporting fairness violations to the contextual combinatorial semi-bandit problem (Cesa-Bianchi & Lugosi, 2009, Gy\"{o}rgy et al., 2007). Finally, we show how to leverage the guarantees of two algorithms in the contextual combinatorial semi-bandit setting: Exp2 (Bubeck et al., 2012) and the oracle-efficient Context-Semi-Bandit-FTPL (Syrgkanis et al., 2016), to provide multi-criteria no regret guarantees simultaneously for accuracy and fairness. Our results eliminate two potential sources of bias from prior work: the "hidden outcomes" that are not available to an algorithm operating in the full information setting, and human biases that might be present in any single human auditor, but can be mitigated by selecting a well chosen panel.

  • 2 authors
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Jun 9, 2022

Bridging the Data Provenance Gap Across Text, Speech and Video

Progress in AI is driven largely by the scale and quality of training data. Despite this, there is a deficit of empirical analysis examining the attributes of well-established datasets beyond text. In this work we conduct the largest and first-of-its-kind longitudinal audit across modalities--popular text, speech, and video datasets--from their detailed sourcing trends and use restrictions to their geographical and linguistic representation. Our manual analysis covers nearly 4000 public datasets between 1990-2024, spanning 608 languages, 798 sources, 659 organizations, and 67 countries. We find that multimodal machine learning applications have overwhelmingly turned to web-crawled, synthetic, and social media platforms, such as YouTube, for their training sets, eclipsing all other sources since 2019. Secondly, tracing the chain of dataset derivations we find that while less than 33% of datasets are restrictively licensed, over 80% of the source content in widely-used text, speech, and video datasets, carry non-commercial restrictions. Finally, counter to the rising number of languages and geographies represented in public AI training datasets, our audit demonstrates measures of relative geographical and multilingual representation have failed to significantly improve their coverage since 2013. We believe the breadth of our audit enables us to empirically examine trends in data sourcing, restrictions, and Western-centricity at an ecosystem-level, and that visibility into these questions are essential to progress in responsible AI. As a contribution to ongoing improvements in dataset transparency and responsible use, we release our entire multimodal audit, allowing practitioners to trace data provenance across text, speech, and video.

  • 43 authors
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Dec 18, 2024 2

STARS: Skill-Triggered Audit for Request-Conditioned Invocation Safety in Agent Systems

Autonomous language-model agents increasingly rely on installable skills and tools to complete user tasks. Static skill auditing can expose capability surface before deployment, but it cannot determine whether a particular invocation is unsafe under the current user request and runtime context. We therefore study skill invocation auditing as a continuous-risk estimation problem: given a user request, candidate skill, and runtime context, predict a score that supports ranking and triage before a hard intervention is applied. We introduce STARS, which combines a static capability prior, a request-conditioned invocation risk model, and a calibrated risk-fusion policy. To evaluate this setting, we construct SIA-Bench, a benchmark of 3,000 invocation records with group-safe splits, lineage metadata, runtime context, canonical action labels, and derived continuous-risk targets. On a held-out split of indirect prompt injection attacks, calibrated fusion reaches 0.439 high-risk AUPRC, improving over 0.405 for the contextual scorer and 0.380 for the strongest static baseline, while the contextual scorer remains better calibrated with 0.289 expected calibration error. On the locked in-distribution test split, gains are smaller and static priors remain useful. The resulting claim is therefore narrower: request-conditioned auditing is most valuable as an invocation-time risk-scoring and triage layer rather than as a replacement for static screening. Code is available at https://github.com/123zgj123/STARS.

  • 4 authors
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Apr 10

Think Again or Think Longer? Selective Verification for Budget-Aware Reasoning

Test-time reasoning is increasingly used as a serving-time control knob, but extra reasoning is not uniformly valuable: it can repair failed attempts, waste compute on already-correct answers, or introduce harmful answer changes. We study this as a deployment allocation problem rather than a new-verifier problem. We introduce \sevra, Selective Verification for Reasoning Allocation, a serving-layer controller that decides whether to preserve a frozen solver's initial answer or invoke active verification. Using a frozen Qwen3-4B solver, we log intervention outcomes and train recoverability-aware gates from serving-visible attempt state. On \mathfive, selective verification reaches 76.3\% accuracy, compared with 75.5\% for always verifying, while reducing post-generation tokens by 26.8\% and harmful flips from 2.2\% to 1.0\%. However, an 8,192-token initial solve reaches 76.0\% accuracy with 28\% fewer total model tokens, showing that selective recovery is useful but not the best tested cost frontier. In frozen transfer to \gsm, the selective policy verifies only 3.0\% of examples, improves accuracy from 93.4\% to 94.5\%, and reduces verification tokens by 91.2\% relative to always verifying; again, a longer initial solve matches its accuracy with fewer realized tokens. On CommonsenseQA, always-on verification hurts, while Self-Consistency@5 improves accuracy at about five times the realized token cost. The resulting deployment rule is: tune the initial budget first, then use selective recovery when explicit checks, bounded retries, auditability, or regression-risk control matter.

Revealing the True Cost of Locally Differentially Private Protocols: An Auditing Perspective

While the existing literature on Differential Privacy (DP) auditing predominantly focuses on the centralized model (e.g., in auditing the DP-SGD algorithm), we advocate for extending this approach to audit Local DP (LDP). To achieve this, we introduce the LDP-Auditor framework for empirically estimating the privacy loss of locally differentially private mechanisms. This approach leverages recent advances in designing privacy attacks against LDP frequency estimation protocols. More precisely, through the analysis of numerous state-of-the-art LDP protocols, we extensively explore the factors influencing the privacy audit, such as the impact of different encoding and perturbation functions. Additionally, we investigate the influence of the domain size and the theoretical privacy loss parameters ε and δ on local privacy estimation. In-depth case studies are also conducted to explore specific aspects of LDP auditing, including distinguishability attacks on LDP protocols for longitudinal studies and multidimensional data. Finally, we present a notable achievement of our LDP-Auditor framework, which is the discovery of a bug in a state-of-the-art LDP Python package. Overall, our LDP-Auditor framework as well as our study offer valuable insights into the sources of randomness and information loss in LDP protocols. These contributions collectively provide a realistic understanding of the local privacy loss, which can help practitioners in selecting the LDP mechanism and privacy parameters that best align with their specific requirements. We open-sourced LDP-Auditor in https://github.com/hharcolezi/ldp-audit.

  • 2 authors
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Sep 4, 2023

LegalHalluLens: Typed Hallucination Auditing and Calibrated Multi-Agent Debate for Trustworthy Legal AI

AI systems deployed in legal workflows hallucinate at rates that aggregate metrics report at ~52%, but this average conceals where errors concentrate and in which direction they run, leaving compliance officers without an actionable signal for trustworthy deployment. We present LegalHalluLens, an auditing framework with three components: typed hallucination profiles across four legally-motivated claim categories (numeric, temporal, obligation/entitlement, factual) over CUAD (Hendrycks et al., 2021); a Risk Direction Index (RDI) that reduces omission-versus-invention bias to a single deployment-comparable scalar; and a typed debate pipeline calibrated to both magnitudes and directions. Across 510 contracts and 249,252 clause-level instances we measure a within-model gap of approximately 38-40 pp between obligation/numeric and temporal claims that aggregate reporting hides, and show that two systems with matched 52% rates can carry opposite RDIs. The debate pipeline reduces fabricated detections by 45% with per-category gains tracking the diagnosis, matching commercial APIs with a substantially smaller backbone (4B active parameters). Typed profiles and RDI surface failure modes that aggregate metrics hide; we further show these diagnostics serve as calibration inputs for multi-agent debate pipelines, where Skeptic challenges and asymmetric gates targeted at measured failure modes outperform generically-tuned debate. The framework supports direction-aware procurement, accountability, and agent design for legal AI deployed in the wild.

PrivacyPeek: Auditing What LLM-Based Agents Acquire, Not Just What They Say

LLM-based agents are rapidly advancing, autonomously invoking external tools to complete multi-step tasks for users. However, agents often acquire more sensitive information than the task requires. Existing privacy benchmarks audit what the agent's response or outgoing actions disclose, but overlook the acquisition stage where data first enters the agent's context. The over-acquired information is then one careless action or one attack away from an outright leak. To assess its prevalence, we introduce PrivacyPeek, a benchmark for evaluating acquisition-stage privacy leakage of LLM-based agents, with 1{,}182 cases across 7 acquisition behaviours and 16 application domains. Specifically, Acquisition Inspection examines the agent's tool-call trajectory, both the tools it invokes and the data it receives, to detect when it acquires sensitive information beyond the task scope. Probe Elicitation then issues a follow-up probe and measures how readily an attacker could elicit sensitive information the agent acquired but did not disclose. Our experiments on 10 LLM-based agents across 4 model families show that the unnecessary acquisition of sensitive information is widespread. In addition, we observe a correlation between the task-completion capability and acquisition-stage leakage. Prompt-level defences reduce only a small fraction of acquisition-stage leakage, leaving the majority unmitigated. These results make auditing acquisition-stage privacy both urgent and necessary. Our dataset and code are available at https://github.com/Xuan269/PrivacyPeek-Resource.

  • 8 authors
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Aug 5 2

A^2E : An End-to-End Agent Auditing Engine

With the rapid advancement of large language models (LLMs), harnesses have become essential infrastructure for deploying agents across a wide range of domains. The fast-evolving harness ecosystem has also made rigorous capability evaluation increasingly important. However, efficiently building an end-to-end, systematic, and comprehensive evaluation pipeline remains a significant challenge. To address this challenge, we introduce A^2E (Agent Auditing Engine), an end-to-end evaluation engine designed for agent harnesses. A^2E leverages our newly proposed Agent Task Protocol (ATP) to enable the rapid integration of evaluation tasks with different harnesses. Through an automatically instrumented Monitor, it captures and generates standardized execution traces during experiments. In the Evaluation stage, A^2E systematically assesses harness capabilities using a suite of multidimensional metrics. Compared with correctness alone, these metrics provide a more fine-grained characterization of differences among harnesses in execution efficiency, tool use, task planning, and error recovery. Experiments conducted with A^2E further reveal that model-harness combinations exhibit substantial performance variation across different types of tasks, and that no single combination consistently outperforms all others across every task. These findings not only demonstrate the necessity of systematic evaluation but also provide useful guidance for the co-evolving of models and harnesses. Our code is available at https://github.com/datamllab/A2E.

Benchmarking Text-to-SQL under Role-Based Access Control

Given a database S and a natural language question Q, text-to-SQL systems aim to generate an SQL query that correctly answers Q when executed against S. Currently, popular text-to-SQL benchmarks mostly assume unrestricted access to S; in practice, however, user access is often restricted, e.g., through role-based access control (RBAC) policies. This leads to a potential disconnect between benchmarking results and real-world performance: an LLM with high benchmark scores might perform poorly in an access-controlled environment, by frequently violating RBAC, or rejecting a query q that could be answered with only permitted data in S. Motivated by this, we present a comprehensive text-to-SQL benchmarking framework with realistic RBAC constraints, which features an LLM-assisted workflow that augments existing text-to-SQL benchmarks with plausible user roles and access policies. To do so, we formulate the problem of role synthesis as a structured reasoning process over the database schema, in which the LLM first infers the application context from the schema, and then derives role responsibilities and access scopes consistent with this context. This process is audited by human-in-the-loop quality control, in which domain experts perform metric-guided screening on the generated roles. Besides the augmented dataset, the proposed framework also contains evaluation metrics that identify RBAC-specific failure modes, and disentangle SQL utility from access-control compliance. We apply the proposed framework to several widely-used benchmarks, and conduct a systematic empirical study of state-of-the-art text-to-SQL systems. The results show that many solutions (especially open-weight LLMs) with high benchmarking scores under an unrestricted setting suffer sharp performance degradation once access constraints are in place, due to frequent RBAC violations.

  • 4 authors
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Jul 23

AISPA: User-Centric System Prompt Auditing for Large Language Model Applications

System prompts are instructions configured by developers to govern the behaviors of foundation models in AI applications. They are used throughout commercial AI products, but are rarely disclosed to the public or regulators, creating a serious trust and accountability gap in the wide deployment of AI systems. In this paper, we introduce Artificial Intelligence System Prompt Assurance (AISPA), a user-centric framework for systematically auditing system prompts in AI systems. AISPA examines specific parts of a system prompt and evaluates them along eight dimensions that matter to users. We then use this framework to review 3,249 instructions from system prompts in 88 commercial AI products, classifying each instruction as either protective (of users) or problematic. Our audit surfaces four core findings. First, system prompt design varies substantially across products and developers, with some organizations averaging over 60 protective instructions per product while others average fewer than 5. Second, protective instructions are widely adopted but shallow in scope: 98.9% of products contain at least one, yet only 24% cover all eight dimensions of the AISPA taxonomy. Third, system prompts have grown steadily longer and more protective of users, suggesting that user protection is becoming a more visible concern in commercial prompt design. Fourth, despite this progress, problematic instructions remain pervasive: roughly 40% of products contain at least one instruction that works against user interests, and protective and problematic instructions frequently coexist within the same prompt. Our findings highlight the need for greater transparency, standardization, and independent oversight for system prompts in commercial AI products.

Prior Audit-Repair Context Shifts LLM Verifier Thresholds Toward Leniency

Automated checking pipelines increasingly place one language model as the checker and another (or the same one) as the fixer. We ask whether that wiring changes what the checker reports. Measuring false alarms on human-verified-correct ProcessBench traces with the present task held byte-identical, we find that a completed audit -> repair episode already in the model's context lowers false alarms in 15 of 15 model x wording combinations, by 2.8 to 11.5 percentage points against a length-matched non-audit control, a 9 to 25% reduction relative to that control. The direction contradicts what the accumulated-message literature predicts: an episode whose audit reported an error lowers false alarms further still, at all five wordings on the model where that manipulation lands cleanly, though a negativity asymmetry predicts more flagging. Decomposing the episode finds repair content and audit verdict complementary: different components carry the effect on different model families. Signal-detection analysis locates the change in the threshold rather than in discrimination -- the criterion moves in 15 of 15 combinations and survives correction in 13 while d' survives in none, though the d' test is half as sensitive by construction -- and a hand audit of 50 false alarms finds 82% simply wrong, so at this operating point the shift need not be harmful. With reasoning enabled the effect keeps its relative size on both models tested, and the threshold reading holds there too.

  • 2 authors
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Aug 16 2

Answer Presence Drives RAG Rewriting Gains

Retrieval-augmented QA pipelines often route retrieved passages through an LLM rewriter before a smaller reader, lifting F1 by tens of points on multi-hop benchmarks; this gain is typically credited to improved evidence quality. We ask whether that lift is causally driven by the gold answer string appearing in the rewritten context rather than by curation per se, using a controlled intervention audit. For each rewritten context we re-run the reader after one of four controlled edits to the compile output: removing the gold answer span, replacing a length-matched random non-answer span (placebo), or injecting the gold into rewrites where it was absent (at the prefix or at a midpoint sentence boundary). Across twelve completed (cell, baseline) intervention runs spanning three reader families (Qwen2.5-7B, Qwen3.5-35B, GLM-4.7), two datasets (HotpotQA, 2WikiMultihopQA), and three compiler arrangements (MA-only, MB-only, MA+verify), removing the gold answer drops reader F1 by 28 to 64 points beyond the length-matched placebo on paired answer-in-compile strata, and prepending the gold into rewrites that lacked it raises F1 by +0.7 to +9.7 points in 10 of 12 (cell, baseline) combinations. A companion five-sentinel audit shows the conventional single-[MASK] probe is itself sentinel-fragile: on 2Wiki it reports a +4.12~F1 ``non-leakage residual'' that flips to -3.33 to -7.81~F1 under four alternative sentinels and fails an equivalence test for three of those four (1/4~pass). We do not propose a new rewriter or mitigation; we release the intervention runner and the sentinel panel so that other rewriter-gain claims can be tested against the same standard.

  • 11 authors
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Jun 3 2

Quality Is Not a Safety Proxy Under Quantization

Quantized checkpoints are often screened first with quality metrics and only later, if at all, with direct safety tests. This paper audits that shortcut on a matched 51-row matrix spanning 6 models, 4 families, a 7-level GGUF ladder, and AWQ/GPTQ INT4 checkpoints. In this matrix the shortcut fails: all 36 quality-safety pairings split direction across models, and 9 hidden-danger rows plus 1 near-hidden-danger row show quality stable or improved while refusal falls by 12-68 percentage points. Seven of the 11 AWQ/GPTQ rows are hidden-danger. A four-probe mechanistic follow-up over the 17 Hugging Face-backed FP16/AWQ/GPTQ cells does not rescue it: entropy, refusal-direction, and calibration probes are weak or null separators of dangerous rows, and although probe-identified safety-associated neurons absorb 1.39times more quantization error overall (p < 5 times 10^{-7}), the effect is not regime-specific. Claude Sonnet 4 relabels 11,470 items in a predefined stratified set, agrees with the primary gemma3:12b judge on 89.9\% of rows (κ= 0.873, 95\% CI [0.866, 0.881]), and changes 0/10 hidden-danger cells. A calibrated study-internal behavioral screen -- the Refusal Template Stability Index (RTSI), built from four refusal-template drift features and calibrated on this matrix -- routes 10/10 hidden- or near-hidden-danger rows to direct safety testing (Wilson 95\% CI lower bound 0.72) while leaving 23 of 45 non-baseline rows in a low-risk bucket under both in-sample scoring and row-level leave-one-out validation; on the same matrix, the best single-feature baselines (unique-prefix-rate-delta, raw refusal-rate delta) recover 9/10 and 8/10 respectively at matched bucket size, and cross-stack transfer requires recalibration. For the quantized checkpoints, model families, and safety outcomes studied here, retained quality cannot waive direct safety evaluation.

  • 1 authors
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Jun 7

Leak It: Per-Document Extraction Beyond Aggregate Membership Inference

Membership inference (MIA) on language models is usually summarised by aggregate ROC-AUC, but such evaluations are confounded: model-free blind baselines can separate members from non-members using surface text alone. Building on probabilistic discoverable extraction, we study black-box training-data leakage using N samples from p_theta(. | x), placing mean overlap, extreme-value overlap, and self-concentration on a common functional-estimation footing. On WikiMIA, a blind bag-of-words classifier reaches AUC 0.97 (TPR 0.90 at 5% FPR) while sampling adds nothing. On an IID Pile split (MIMIR), neither self-concentration nor gold-continuation recovery significantly exceeds a blind baseline in aggregate. Aggregate metrics hide the real harm: sampling verbatim-extracts training data for a tail of documents no blind attack can reach. On Pythia-6.9B, 16.6% of 500 Pile documents bearing a real identifier (83 documents; 21.3% of those bearing an email address) have that identifier reproduced and not reproduced under a mismatched-prefix control. Each leak is attributable to that document rather than a globally common string. This per-document disclosure is invisible to aggregate AUC. Risk is uneven: identifier leakage is about 3x stronger in code than prose, though prose remains positive and grows with capacity (4.0% to 12.1% from 410M to 6.9B); recovery of arbitrary held-out continuations is essentially confined to code (+0.44 member gap on GitHub vs at most +0.014 on prose). Temperature and nucleus sampling have minor effect, a 16-token prefix suffices, and the sample-budget relationship corroborates prior probabilistic-extraction results. We detect no reduction from deduplication. Privacy audits should report per-document extraction, not only aggregate membership, and motivate differential privacy as the mitigation. We release leakit, a black-box tool implementing this probe and its control.

  • 1 authors
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Aug 9

Re-Evaluating EVMBench: Are AI Agents Ready for Smart Contract Security?

EVMbench, released by OpenAI, Paradigm, and OtterSec, is the first large-scale benchmark for AI agents on smart contract security. Its results -- agents detect up to 45.6% of vulnerabilities and exploit 72.2% of a curated subset -- have fueled expectations that fully automated AI auditing is within reach. We identify two limitations: its narrow evaluation scope (14 agent configurations, most models tested on only their vendor scaffold) and its reliance on audit-contest data published before every model's release that models may have seen during training. To address these, we expand to 26 configurations across four model families and three scaffolds, and introduce a contamination-free dataset of 22 real-world security incidents postdating every model's release date. Our evaluation yields three findings: (1) agents' detection results are not stable, with rankings shifting across configurations, tasks, and datasets; (2) on real-world incidents, no agent succeeds at end-to-end exploitation across all 110 agent-incident pairs despite detecting up to 65% of vulnerabilities, contradicting EVMbench's conclusion that discovery is the primary bottleneck; and (3) scaffolding materially affects results, with an open-source scaffold outperforming vendor alternatives by up to 5 percentage points, yet EVMbench does not control for this. These findings challenge the narrative that fully automated AI auditing is imminent. Agents reliably catch well-known patterns and respond strongly to human-provided context, but cannot replace human judgment. For developers, agent scans serve as a pre-deployment check. For audit firms, agents are most effective within a human-in-the-loop workflow where AI handles breadth and human auditors contribute protocol-specific knowledge and adversarial reasoning. Code and data: https://github.com/blocksecteam/ReEVMBench/.

  • 3 authors
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Mar 10

Beyond Test Presence: Assessing the Quality and Robustness of Agent-Generated Tests in Open-Source Projects

The integration of AI-powered coding agents into Continuous Integration/Continuous Delivery (CI/CD) pipelines has fundamentally altered how software verification is conducted. While these agents successfully automate the test generation, current evaluation benchmarks (e.g., SWE-bench) largely focus on pass-rates rather than the intrinsic quality of the generated tests. This raises the possibility of "stealth technical debt", in which test suites pass execution but do not offer comprehensive coverage or semantic value. We address this methodological gap through a large-scale, empirical comparison of 204,673 test artifacts which comprises of 24,941 human-authored files and 179,732 agent-generated files; sourced from the AIDev dataset. Using the Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) parsing with Python's naive ast module, we implemented a "white-box" static analysis framework to evaluate three quality dimensions: Assertion Strength (RQ1), Edge-Case Coverage (RQ2), and Flakiness Potential (RQ3). Our results present a nuanced inversion of traditional assumptions. AI agents performed better than humans in Edge-Case Coverage, with almost twice the variety of boundary checks (Variety Score: 0.62 vs 0.32) and a higher frequency of null-safety testing (13.40% vs. 8.3%), even though human developers had a slight advantage in Assertion Strength (88.1% strong assertions vs. 85.37% for agents). But this thoroughness comes at a price: due mostly to their reliance on file I/O and non-deterministic logic, agent-generated tests exhibited a higher risk of flakiness (Candidate Rate: 0.41 vs. 0.30). These findings suggest that while AI agents excel at rigorous boundary testing, they lack the "environmental awareness" needed to write stable, hermetic tests.

  • 4 authors
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Jul 12

Conditional Coverage Diagnostics for Conformal Prediction

Evaluating conditional coverage remains one of the most persistent challenges in assessing the reliability of predictive systems. Although conformal methods can give guarantees on marginal coverage, no method can guarantee to produce sets with correct conditional coverage, leaving practitioners without a clear way to interpret local deviations. To overcome sample-inefficiency and overfitting issues of existing metrics, we cast conditional coverage estimation as a classification problem. Conditional coverage is violated if and only if some classifier can achieve lower risk than the target coverage. Through the choice of a (proper) loss function, the resulting risk difference gives a conservative estimate of natural miscoverage measures such as L1 and L2 distance, and can even separate the effects of over- and under-coverage, and non-constant target coverages. We call the resulting family of metrics excess risk of the target coverage (ERT). We show experimentally that the use of modern classifiers provides much higher statistical power than simple classifiers underlying established metrics like CovGap. Additionally, we use our metric to benchmark different conformal prediction methods. Finally, we release an open-source package for ERT as well as previous conditional coverage metrics. Together, these contributions provide a new lens for understanding, diagnosing, and improving the conditional reliability of predictive systems.

  • 4 authors
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May 28

TessPay: Verify-then-Pay Infrastructure for Trusted Agentic Commerce

The global economy is entering the era of Agentic Commerce, where autonomous agents can discover services, negotiate prices, and transact value. However adoption towards agentic commerce faces a foundational trust gap: current systems are built for direct human interactions rather than agent-driven operations. It lacks core primitives across three critical stages of agentic transactions. First, Task Delegation lacks means to translate user intent into defined scopes, discover appropriate agents, and securely authorize actions. Second, Payment Settlement for tasks is processed before execution, lacking verifiable evidence to validate the agent's work. Third, Audit Mechanisms fail to capture the full transaction lifecycle, preventing clear accountability for disputes. While emerging standards address fragments of this trust gap, there still remains a critical need for a unified infrastructure that binds the entire transaction lifecycle. To resolve this gap, we introduce TessPay, a unified infrastructure that replaces implicit trust with a 'Verify-then-Pay' architecture. It is a two plane architecture separating control and verification from settlement. TessPay operationalizes trust across four distinct stages: Before execution, agents are anchored in a canonical registry and user intent is captured as verifiable mandates, enabling stakeholder accountability. During execution, funds are locked in escrow while the agent executes the task and generates cryptographic evidence (TLS Notary, TEE etc.) to support Proof of Task Execution (PoTE). At settlement, the system verifies this evidence and releases funds only when the PoTE satisfies verification predicates; modular rail adapters ensure this PoTE-gated escrow remains chain-agnostic across heterogeneous payment rails. After settlement, TessPay preserves a tamper-evident audit trail to enable clear accountability for dispute resolution.

  • 3 authors
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Jan 29 1

Evidence Sufficiency Under Delayed Ground Truth: Proxy Monitoring for Risk Decision Systems

Machine learning systems in fraud detection, credit scoring, and clinical risk assessment operate under delayed ground truth: outcome labels arrive days to months after the decision they evaluate. During this blind period, governance evidence degrades through mechanisms that neither drift detection methods nor governance frameworks adequately address. This paper formalizes an evidence sufficiency model with four dimensions (completeness, freshness, reliability, representativeness) and a decision-readiness gate that quantifies how label latency degrades evidence quality. The model maps three drift types to dimension-specific degradation trajectories. A complementary proxy indicator framework comprising seven measurement categories estimates sufficiency degradation without labels, with explicit coverage mapping and characterized blind spots per drift type. Evaluation on the IEEE-CIS Fraud Detection dataset (~590K transactions) with controlled drift injection shows that composite proxy monitoring detects covariate and mixed drift with 100% detection rate, while concept drift without feature change remains undetected -- consistent with the theoretical impossibility of unsupervised detection when P(X) is unchanged. Blind period simulation confirms monotone sufficiency degradation, with concept drift degrading fastest (S=0.242 at day 60 vs 0.418 for no-drift). The framework contributes a governance sufficiency monitoring instrument; its value lies in translating drift signals into auditable sufficiency assessments with characterized blind spots. Mapping sufficiency levels to governance actions requires deployment-specific calibration beyond this study's scope.

  • 1 authors
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Apr 16

The Blind Curator: How a Biased Judge Silently Disables Skill Retirement in Self-Evolving Agents

A self-evolving agent retires its bad skills by watching them fail, so what happens when the judge cannot see the failures? Skill retirement is the structural constraint that keeps a growing library from drifting below the no-skill baseline, but its guarantee assumes an unbiased reward, which is false for the LLM judges that reference-free tasks force upon us. We show that a biased judge does not merely add noise; it silently switches off the curator. We make this precise with a corrupted-reward analysis and, isolating the causal channel by injecting corruption on top of a deterministic reward, a behavioral study on a reference-free report-writing testbed with a code-generation cross-check. Symmetric noise leaves retirement intact, but false-pass bias (failures slipping through as passes) disables contribution-based retirement past a sharp threshold that no amount of data can cross. Separating genuine retirement from cap-eviction churn shows this mechanism failure is universal, holding across domains and failure rates and sparing only near-zero-false-pass, verifier-like graders. The downstream outcome, though, is regime-dependent: eval quality degrades only where the same corruption also starves skill synthesis, and otherwise holds steady, so the disabled curator is silent, surfacing in no aggregate metric. The contribution is a behavioral safety result, not a performance one. A cheap defect-injection audit then tells an operator, before deployment, which side of the threshold their judge occupies.

  • 7 authors
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Jul 7

FormInv: A Measurement Protocol for Semantic Invariance in Mathematical Reasoning Benchmarks

A paraphrase-quality audit of MathCheck (ICLR 2025) detected 4 semantically incorrect paraphrases in 129 groups (3.1%); removing them drops GPT-4o from rank 2 to rank 4 and elevates Claude Haiku and DeepSeek V3 above it; these ranking changes are invisible to any single-model evaluation. Cross-model unanimity found these errors automatically (>= 3/4 models for MathCheck; >= 6/9 for our primary evaluation) for under $10; in our own dataset the same protocol found that 47% of auto-generated connective-variation paraphrases were semantically incorrect. That flaw compounds a deeper measurement gap: Claude Haiku 4.5 achieves 86% accuracy yet SCR=50%, meaning half its theorems are answered differently under semantically equivalent restatements, while aggregate accuracy across 9 models spans only 86-96% yet Semantic Consistency Rates (SCR) span 50-82% -- a 32-point gap invisible to standard benchmarks. Formally, for any target ranking over 9 frontier models there exists a weighting over paraphrase families that realizes it (No-Free-Benchmark corollary), because no model Pareto-dominates all families -- so benchmark designers who select families are implicitly choosing which model wins. FormInv supplies the audit protocol (replicated on external benchmarks at 100% recall), SCR and per-theorem Cochran's Q as primary invariance measures evaluated on 9 models across 366-811 items (on Lean4-verified theorems), and FormInvSelector for regime-aware model selection.

  • 2 authors
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May 26

Test Coverage Analysis of Agentic Pull Requests

AI coding agents increasingly submit complete pull requests (PRs) with minimal human intervention, shifting software development from AI-assisted to autonomous workflows. As these agents become more prevalent, ensuring the code they generate is adequately tested, by existing tests or by tests the agents write, is critical to preventing regressions, yet little is known about testing in agentic PRs. To address this gap, we analyze 4882 agent-generated PRs from the AIDev dataset (532 Java and 4350 Python PRs) produced by five coding agents. We study (i) how often agents include test changes and (ii) how well covered are code changes by existing and agent-written tests. Agents include test changes in only 49.6% of PRs that change code under test files. Existing tests provide an incomplete safety net: they cover 61.5% of agents' changed executable lines in Java and only 27.0% in Python, where 64.8% of PRs have no changed line executed by any existing test. Agent-written tests improve coverage over existing tests, but only in a minority of PRs: 35.9% of Java and 22.5% of Python Code + Tests PRs show a coverage gain. Across both languages, error-handling constructs (e.g., try and catch blocks) are the most consistently under-tested, with miss rates reaching 86.0% in Java and 81.0% in Python. These findings motivate coverage-aware development practices, coverage feedback loops for coding agents, and evaluation benchmarks that measure test quality to better help agents reliably test their own code.

  • 4 authors
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Jul 19

AgentLeak: A Full-Stack Benchmark for Privacy Leakage in Multi-Agent LLM Systems

Multi-agent Large Language Model (LLM) systems create privacy risks that current benchmarks cannot measure. When agents coordinate on tasks, sensitive data passes through inter-agent messages, shared memory, and tool arguments; pathways that output-only audits never inspect. We introduce AgentLeak, to the best of our knowledge the first full-stack benchmark for privacy leakage covering internal channels, spanning 1,000 scenarios across healthcare, finance, legal, and corporate domains, paired with a 32-class attack taxonomy and three-tier detection pipeline. Testing GPT-4o, GPT-4o-mini, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Mistral Large, and Llama 3.3 70B across 4,979 traces reveals that multi-agent configurations reduce per-channel output leakage (C1: 27.2% vs 43.2% in single-agent) but introduce unmonitored internal channels that raise total system exposure to 68.9% (OR-aggregated across C1, C2, C5). Internal channels account for most of this gap: inter-agent messages (C2) leak at 68.8%, compared to 27.2% on C1 (output channel). This means that output-only audits miss 41.7% of violations. Claude 3.5 Sonnet, which emphasizes safety alignment in its design, achieves the lowest leakage rates on both external (3.3%) and internal (28.1%) channels, suggesting that model-level safety training may transfer to internal channel protection. Across all five models and four domains, the pattern C2 > C1 holds consistently, confirming that inter-agent communication is the primary vulnerability. These findings underscore the need for coordination frameworks that incorporate internal-channel privacy protections and enforce privacy controls on inter-agent communication.

  • 3 authors
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Feb 11 1

MCP Safety Audit: LLMs with the Model Context Protocol Allow Major Security Exploits

To reduce development overhead and enable seamless integration between potential components comprising any given generative AI application, the Model Context Protocol (MCP) (Anthropic, 2024) has recently been released and subsequently widely adopted. The MCP is an open protocol that standardizes API calls to large language models (LLMs), data sources, and agentic tools. By connecting multiple MCP servers, each defined with a set of tools, resources, and prompts, users are able to define automated workflows fully driven by LLMs. However, we show that the current MCP design carries a wide range of security risks for end users. In particular, we demonstrate that industry-leading LLMs may be coerced into using MCP tools to compromise an AI developer's system through various attacks, such as malicious code execution, remote access control, and credential theft. To proactively mitigate these and related attacks, we introduce a safety auditing tool, MCPSafetyScanner, the first agentic tool to assess the security of an arbitrary MCP server. MCPScanner uses several agents to (a) automatically determine adversarial samples given an MCP server's tools and resources; (b) search for related vulnerabilities and remediations based on those samples; and (c) generate a security report detailing all findings. Our work highlights serious security issues with general-purpose agentic workflows while also providing a proactive tool to audit MCP server safety and address detected vulnerabilities before deployment. The described MCP server auditing tool, MCPSafetyScanner, is freely available at: https://github.com/johnhalloran321/mcpSafetyScanner

  • 2 authors
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Apr 2, 2025 3

TestGenEval: A Real World Unit Test Generation and Test Completion Benchmark

Code generation models can help improve many common software tasks ranging from code completion to defect prediction. Most of the existing benchmarks for code generation LLMs focus on code authoring or code completion. Surprisingly, there has been far less effort dedicated to benchmarking software testing, despite the strong correlation between well-tested software and effective bug detection. To address this gap, we create and release TestGenEval, a large-scale benchmark to measure test generation performance. Based on SWEBench, TestGenEval comprises 68,647 tests from 1,210 code and test file pairs across 11 well-maintained Python repositories. It covers initial tests authoring, test suite completion, and code coverage improvements. Test authoring simulates the process of a developer writing a test suite from scratch, while test completion mimics the scenario where a developer aims to improve the coverage of an existing test suite. We evaluate several popular models, with sizes ranging from 7B to 405B parameters. Our detailed analysis highlights TestGenEval's contribution to a comprehensive evaluation of test generation performance. In particular, models struggle to generate high-coverage test suites, with the best model, GPT-4o, achieving an average coverage of only 35.2%. This is primarily due to models struggling to reason about execution, and their frequent assertion errors when addressing complex code paths.

  • 3 authors
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Oct 1, 2024

ClawProBench: Trace-Aware Evaluation of AI Agents with Runtime Coverage and Frozen Workplace-Style Holdouts

Agent benchmarks often evaluate only final answers even when agents run on stateful runtimes. We argue this under-specifies what is being evaluated: the proper unit is a declared model-plus-runtime configuration whose failures can occur in evidence acquisition, runtime routing, safety boundaries, or repeated execution. We present ClawProBench, a trace-aware benchmark for runtime-native agent evaluation instantiated on OpenClaw, a live agent runtime with workspace tools and native surfaces for browsing, memory, messaging, scheduling, skills, and subagents. ClawProBench defines two tracks: a 102-scenario full profile with live workspace and native-runtime routing tasks, and a frozen 68-scenario holdout with closed-world JSON output contracts for robust ranking. Trials are scored from execution traces via a safety-gated formula combining correctness, process quality, and efficiency, preserving failure evidence for audit. Our anonymous artifact includes benchmark definitions, scoring code, manifests and sanitized traces. We evaluate 68 configurations on the full profile and 37 on holdout. The top safety-gated average trace score is 0.7671. Native-runtime tasks underperform workspace-live tasks (0.5238 vs. 0.6415). On holdout, pass@k-any outperforms strict three-trial pass (0.6638 vs. 0.2890), while full-profile and holdout rankings show weak alignment (Spearman 0.1300). Rankings based purely on correctness differ substantially from process-aware, safety-gated and strict-pass views. Final-answer leaderboards may hide native-surface weaknesses, one-off successes and trace-local agent failure modes.

  • 1 authors
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Aug 22 2