Daily Papers

The large-scale recommender system mainly consists of two stages: matching and ranking. The matching stage (also known as the retrieval step) identifies a small fraction of relevant items from billion-scale item corpus in low latency and computational cost. Item-to-item collaborative filter (item-based CF) and embedding-based retrieval (EBR) have been long used in the industrial matching stage owing to its efficiency. However, item-based CF is hard to meet personalization, while EBR has difficulty in satisfying diversity. In this paper, we propose a novel matching architecture, Path-based Deep Network (named PDN), which can incorporate both personalization and diversity to enhance matching performance. Specifically, PDN is comprised of two modules: Trigger Net and Similarity Net. PDN utilizes Trigger Net to capture the user's interest in each of his/her interacted item, and Similarity Net to evaluate the similarity between each interacted item and the target item based on these items' profile and CF information. The final relevance between the user and the target item is calculated by explicitly considering user's diverse interests, \ie aggregating the relevance weights of the related two-hop paths (one hop of a path corresponds to user-item interaction and the other to item-item relevance). Furthermore, we describe the architecture design of a matching system with the proposed PDN in a leading real-world E-Commerce service (Mobile Taobao App). Based on offline evaluations and online A/B test, we show that PDN outperforms the existing solutions for the same task. The online results also demonstrate that PDN can retrieve more personalized and more diverse relevant items to significantly improve user engagement. Currently, PDN system has been successfully deployed at Mobile Taobao App and handling major online traffic.

The goal of dialogue relation extraction (DRE) is to identify the relation between two entities in a given dialogue. During conversations, speakers may expose their relations to certain entities by explicit or implicit clues, such evidences called "triggers". However, trigger annotations may not be always available for the target data, so it is challenging to leverage such information for enhancing the performance. Therefore, this paper proposes to learn how to identify triggers from the data with trigger annotations and then transfers the trigger-finding capability to other datasets for better performance. The experiments show that the proposed approach is capable of improving relation extraction performance of unseen relations and also demonstrate the transferability of our proposed trigger-finding model across different domains and datasets.

Most tasks in natural language processing can be cast into question answering (QA) problems over language input. We introduce the dynamic memory network (DMN), a neural network architecture which processes input sequences and questions, forms episodic memories, and generates relevant answers. Questions trigger an iterative attention process which allows the model to condition its attention on the inputs and the result of previous iterations. These results are then reasoned over in a hierarchical recurrent sequence model to generate answers. The DMN can be trained end-to-end and obtains state-of-the-art results on several types of tasks and datasets: question answering (Facebook's bAbI dataset), text classification for sentiment analysis (Stanford Sentiment Treebank) and sequence modeling for part-of-speech tagging (WSJ-PTB). The training for these different tasks relies exclusively on trained word vector representations and input-question-answer triplets.

Deep neural networks (DNNs) and generative AI (GenAI) are increasingly vulnerable to backdoor attacks, where adversaries embed triggers into inputs to cause models to misclassify or misinterpret target labels. Beyond traditional single-trigger scenarios, attackers may inject multiple triggers across various object classes, forming unseen backdoor-object configurations that evade standard detection pipelines. In this paper, we introduce DBOM (Disentangled Backdoor-Object Modeling), a proactive framework that leverages structured disentanglement to identify and neutralize both seen and unseen backdoor threats at the dataset level. Specifically, DBOM factorizes input image representations by modeling triggers and objects as independent primitives in the embedding space through the use of Vision-Language Models (VLMs). By leveraging the frozen, pre-trained encoders of VLMs, our approach decomposes the latent representations into distinct components through a learnable visual prompt repository and prompt prefix tuning, ensuring that the relationships between triggers and objects are explicitly captured. To separate trigger and object representations in the visual prompt repository, we introduce the trigger-object separation and diversity losses that aids in disentangling trigger and object visual features. Next, by aligning image features with feature decomposition and fusion, as well as learned contextual prompt tokens in a shared multimodal space, DBOM enables zero-shot generalization to novel trigger-object pairings that were unseen during training, thereby offering deeper insights into adversarial attack patterns. Experimental results on CIFAR-10 and GTSRB demonstrate that DBOM robustly detects poisoned images prior to downstream training, significantly enhancing the security of DNN training pipelines.

Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) have achieved promising results in various tasks such as node classification and graph classification. Recent studies find that GNNs are vulnerable to adversarial attacks. However, effective backdoor attacks on graphs are still an open problem. In particular, backdoor attack poisons the graph by attaching triggers and the target class label to a set of nodes in the training graph. The backdoored GNNs trained on the poisoned graph will then be misled to predict test nodes to target class once attached with triggers. Though there are some initial efforts in graph backdoor attacks, our empirical analysis shows that they may require a large attack budget for effective backdoor attacks and the injected triggers can be easily detected and pruned. Therefore, in this paper, we study a novel problem of unnoticeable graph backdoor attacks with limited attack budget. To fully utilize the attack budget, we propose to deliberately select the nodes to inject triggers and target class labels in the poisoning phase. An adaptive trigger generator is deployed to obtain effective triggers that are difficult to be noticed. Extensive experiments on real-world datasets against various defense strategies demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed method in conducting effective unnoticeable backdoor attacks.

Despite advances in the programmable logic capabilities of modern trigger systems, a significant bottleneck remains in the amount of data to be transported from the detector to off-detector logic where trigger decisions are made. We demonstrate that a neural network autoencoder model can be implemented in a radiation tolerant ASIC to perform lossy data compression alleviating the data transmission problem while preserving critical information of the detector energy profile. For our application, we consider the high-granularity calorimeter from the CMS experiment at the CERN Large Hadron Collider. The advantage of the machine learning approach is in the flexibility and configurability of the algorithm. By changing the neural network weights, a unique data compression algorithm can be deployed for each sensor in different detector regions, and changing detector or collider conditions. To meet area, performance, and power constraints, we perform a quantization-aware training to create an optimized neural network hardware implementation. The design is achieved through the use of high-level synthesis tools and the hls4ml framework, and was processed through synthesis and physical layout flows based on a LP CMOS 65 nm technology node. The flow anticipates 200 Mrad of ionizing radiation to select gates, and reports a total area of 3.6 mm^2 and consumes 95 mW of power. The simulated energy consumption per inference is 2.4 nJ. This is the first radiation tolerant on-detector ASIC implementation of a neural network that has been designed for particle physics applications.

To achieve reliable, robust, and safe AI systems, it is vital to implement fallback strategies when AI predictions cannot be trusted. Certifiers for neural networks are a reliable way to check the robustness of these predictions. They guarantee for some predictions that a certain class of manipulations or attacks could not have changed the outcome. For the remaining predictions without guarantees, the method abstains from making a prediction, and a fallback strategy needs to be invoked, which typically incurs additional costs, can require a human operator, or even fail to provide any prediction. While this is a key concept towards safe and secure AI, we show for the first time that this approach comes with its own security risks, as such fallback strategies can be deliberately triggered by an adversary. In addition to naturally occurring abstains for some inputs and perturbations, the adversary can use training-time attacks to deliberately trigger the fallback with high probability. This transfers the main system load onto the fallback, reducing the overall system's integrity and/or availability. We design two novel availability attacks, which show the practical relevance of these threats. For example, adding 1% poisoned data during training is sufficient to trigger the fallback and hence make the model unavailable for up to 100% of all inputs by inserting the trigger. Our extensive experiments across multiple datasets, model architectures, and certifiers demonstrate the broad applicability of these attacks. An initial investigation into potential defenses shows that current approaches are insufficient to mitigate the issue, highlighting the need for new, specific solutions.

Due to their proven efficiency, machine-learning systems are deployed in a wide range of complex real-life problems. More specifically, Spiking Neural Networks (SNNs) emerged as a promising solution to the accuracy, resource-utilization, and energy-efficiency challenges in machine-learning systems. While these systems are going mainstream, they have inherent security and reliability issues. In this paper, we propose NeuroAttack, a cross-layer attack that threatens the SNNs integrity by exploiting low-level reliability issues through a high-level attack. Particularly, we trigger a fault-injection based sneaky hardware backdoor through a carefully crafted adversarial input noise. Our results on Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) and SNNs show a serious integrity threat to state-of-the art machine-learning techniques.

We present (Experience-Modulated Biologically-inspired Emergent Reasoning), a hybrid cognitive architecture that reorganises the relationship between large language models (LLMs) and memory: rather than augmenting an LLM with retrieval tools, we place the LLM as a replaceable reasoning engine within a persistent, biologically-grounded associative substrate. The architecture centres on a 220,000-neuron spiking neural network (SNN) with spike-timing-dependent plasticity (STDP), four-layer hierarchical organisation (sensory/concept/category/meta-pattern), inhibitory E/I balance, and reward-modulated learning. Text embeddings are encoded into the SNN via a novel z-score standardised top-k population code that is dimension-independent by construction, achieving 82.2\% discrimination retention across embedding dimensionalities. We show that STDP lateral propagation during idle operation can trigger and shape LLM actions without external prompting or scripted triggers: the SNN determines when to act and what associations to surface, while the LLM selects the action type and generates content. In one instance, the system autonomously initiated contact with a user after learned person-topic associations fired laterally during an 8-hour idle period. From a clean start with zero learned weights, the first SNN-triggered action occurred after only 7 conversational exchanges (14 messages).

EEG-based neural networks, pivotal in medical diagnosis and brain-computer interfaces, face significant intellectual property (IP) risks due to their reliance on sensitive neurophysiological data and resource-intensive development. Current watermarking methods, particularly those using abstract trigger sets, lack robust authentication and fail to address the unique challenges of EEG models. This paper introduces a cryptographic wonder filter-based watermarking framework tailored for EEG-based neural networks. Leveraging collision-resistant hashing and public-key encryption, the wonder filter embeds the watermark during training, ensuring minimal distortion (leq 5% drop in EEG task accuracy) and high reliability (100\% watermark detection). The framework is rigorously evaluated against adversarial attacks, including fine-tuning, transfer learning, and neuron pruning. Results demonstrate persistent watermark retention, with classification accuracy for watermarked states remaining above 90\% even after aggressive pruning, while primary task performance degrades faster, deterring removal attempts. Piracy resistance is validated by the inability to embed secondary watermarks without severe accuracy loss ( >10% in EEGNet and CCNN models). Cryptographic hashing ensures authentication, reducing brute-force attack success probabilities. Evaluated on the DEAP dataset across models (CCNN, EEGNet, TSception), the method achieves >99.4% null-embedding accuracy, effectively eliminating false positives. By integrating wonder filters with EEG-specific adaptations, this work bridges a critical gap in IP protection for neurophysiological models, offering a secure, tamper-proof solution for healthcare and biometric applications. The framework's robustness against adversarial modifications underscores its potential to safeguard sensitive EEG models while maintaining diagnostic utility.

We develop an end-to-end workflow for the training and implementation of co-designed neural networks (NNs) for efficient field-programmable gate array (FPGA) and application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) hardware. Our approach leverages Hessian-aware quantization (HAWQ) of NNs, the Quantized Open Neural Network Exchange (QONNX) intermediate representation, and the hls4ml tool flow for transpiling NNs into FPGA and ASIC firmware. This makes efficient NN implementations in hardware accessible to nonexperts, in a single open-sourced workflow that can be deployed for real-time machine learning applications in a wide range of scientific and industrial settings. We demonstrate the workflow in a particle physics application involving trigger decisions that must operate at the 40 MHz collision rate of the CERN Large Hadron Collider (LHC). Given the high collision rate, all data processing must be implemented on custom ASIC and FPGA hardware within a strict area and latency. Based on these constraints, we implement an optimized mixed-precision NN classifier for high-momentum particle jets in simulated LHC proton-proton collisions.

Forecasting epileptic seizures from multivariate EEG signals represents a critical challenge in healthcare time series prediction, requiring high sensitivity, low false alarm rates, and subject-specific adaptability. We present STAN, an Adversarial Spatio-Temporal Attention Network that jointly models spatial brain connectivity and temporal neural dynamics through cascaded attention blocks with alternating spatial and temporal modules. Unlike existing approaches that assume fixed preictal durations or separately process spatial and temporal features, STAN captures bidirectional dependencies between spatial and temporal patterns through a unified cascaded architecture. Adversarial training with gradient penalty enables robust discrimination between interictal and preictal states learned from clearly defined 15-minute preictal windows. Continuous 90-minute pre-seizure monitoring reveals that the learned spatio-temporal attention patterns enable early detection: reliable alarms trigger at subject-specific times (typically 15-45 minutes before onset), reflecting the model's capacity to capture subtle preictal dynamics without requiring individualized training. Experiments on two benchmark EEG datasets (CHB-MIT scalp: 8 subjects, 46 events; MSSM intracranial: 4 subjects, 14 events) demonstrate state-of-the-art performance: 96.6% sensitivity with 0.011 false detections per hour and 94.2% sensitivity with 0.063 false detections per hour, respectively, while maintaining computational efficiency (2.3M parameters, 45 ms latency, 180 MB memory) for real-time edge deployment. Beyond epilepsy, the proposed framework provides a general paradigm for spatio-temporal forecasting in healthcare and other time series domains where individual heterogeneity and interpretability are crucial.

Event-based cameras are attracting significant interest as they provide rich edge information, high dynamic range, and high temporal resolution. Many state-of-the-art event-based algorithms rely on splitting the events into fixed groups, resulting in the omission of crucial temporal information, particularly when dealing with diverse motion scenarios (\eg, high/low speed).In this work, we propose SpikeSlicer, a novel-designed plug-and-play event processing method capable of splitting events stream adaptively.SpikeSlicer utilizes a low-energy spiking neural network (SNN) to trigger event slicing. To guide the SNN to fire spikes at optimal time steps, we propose the Spiking Position-aware Loss (SPA-Loss) to modulate the neuron's state. Additionally, we develop a Feedback-Update training strategy that refines the slicing decisions using feedback from the downstream artificial neural network (ANN). Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method yields significant performance improvements in event-based object tracking and recognition. Notably, SpikeSlicer provides a brand-new SNN-ANN cooperation paradigm, where the SNN acts as an efficient, low-energy data processor to assist the ANN in improving downstream performance, injecting new perspectives and potential avenues of exploration.

Semantic segmentation of remotely sensed images plays a crucial role in precision agriculture, environmental protection, and economic assessment. In recent years, substantial fine-resolution remote sensing images are available for semantic segmentation. However, due to the complicated information caused by the increased spatial resolution, state-of-the-art deep learning algorithms normally utilize complex network architectures for segmentation, which usually incurs high computational complexity. Specifically, the high-caliber performance of the convolutional neural network (CNN) heavily relies on fine-grained spatial details (fine resolution) and sufficient contextual information (large receptive fields), both of which trigger high computational costs. This crucially impedes their practicability and availability in real-world scenarios that require real-time processing. In this paper, we propose an Attentive Bilateral Contextual Network (ABCNet), a convolutional neural network (CNN) with double branches, with prominently lower computational consumptions compared to the cutting-edge algorithms, while maintaining a competitive accuracy. Code is available at https://github.com/lironui/ABCNet.

Backdoor attacks have become a significant threat to the pre-training and deployment of deep neural networks (DNNs). Although numerous methods for detecting and mitigating backdoor attacks have been proposed, most rely on identifying and eliminating the ``shortcut" created by the backdoor, which links a specific source class to a target class. However, these approaches can be easily circumvented by designing multiple backdoor triggers that create shortcuts everywhere and therefore nowhere specific. In this study, we explore the concept of Multi-Trigger Backdoor Attacks (MTBAs), where multiple adversaries leverage different types of triggers to poison the same dataset. By proposing and investigating three types of multi-trigger attacks including parallel, sequential, and hybrid attacks, we demonstrate that 1) multiple triggers can coexist, overwrite, or cross-activate one another, and 2) MTBAs easily break the prevalent shortcut assumption underlying most existing backdoor detection/removal methods, rendering them ineffective. Given the security risk posed by MTBAs, we have created a multi-trigger backdoor poisoning dataset to facilitate future research on detecting and mitigating these attacks, and we also discuss potential defense strategies against MTBAs. Our code is available at https://github.com/bboylyg/Multi-Trigger-Backdoor-Attacks.

Temporal graphs are widely used to model dynamic systems with time-varying interactions. In real-world scenarios, the underlying mechanisms of generating future interactions in dynamic systems are typically governed by a set of recurring substructures within the graph, known as temporal motifs. Despite the success and prevalence of current temporal graph neural networks (TGNN), it remains uncertain which temporal motifs are recognized as the significant indications that trigger a certain prediction from the model, which is a critical challenge for advancing the explainability and trustworthiness of current TGNNs. To address this challenge, we propose a novel approach, called Temporal Motifs Explainer (TempME), which uncovers the most pivotal temporal motifs guiding the prediction of TGNNs. Derived from the information bottleneck principle, TempME extracts the most interaction-related motifs while minimizing the amount of contained information to preserve the sparsity and succinctness of the explanation. Events in the explanations generated by TempME are verified to be more spatiotemporally correlated than those of existing approaches, providing more understandable insights. Extensive experiments validate the superiority of TempME, with up to 8.21% increase in terms of explanation accuracy across six real-world datasets and up to 22.96% increase in boosting the prediction Average Precision of current TGNNs.

Backdoor attack is a major threat to deep learning systems in safety-critical scenarios, which aims to trigger misbehavior of neural network models under attacker-controlled conditions. However, most backdoor attacks have to modify the neural network models through training with poisoned data and/or direct model editing, which leads to a common but false belief that backdoor attack can be easily avoided by properly protecting the model. In this paper, we show that backdoor attacks can be achieved without any model modification. Instead of injecting backdoor logic into the training data or the model, we propose to place a carefully-designed patch (namely backdoor patch) in front of the camera, which is fed into the model together with the input images. The patch can be trained to behave normally at most of the time, while producing wrong prediction when the input image contains an attacker-controlled trigger object. Our main techniques include an effective training method to generate the backdoor patch and a digital-physical transformation modeling method to enhance the feasibility of the patch in real deployments. Extensive experiments show that PatchBackdoor can be applied to common deep learning models (VGG, MobileNet, ResNet) with an attack success rate of 93% to 99% on classification tasks. Moreover, we implement PatchBackdoor in real-world scenarios and show that the attack is still threatening.

The Network Data Analytics Function (NWDAF) is central to enabling zero-touch network management in fifth-generation (5G) networks by supporting real-time analytics and closed-loop automation. Despite its critical role, open-source NWDAF implementations remain limited in scope and accessibility. In this paper, we develop an open-source NWDAF, compatible with the open-source core network Free5GC, that collects network data via subscriptions to Network Functions (NFs), and also includes an integrated Large Language Model (LLM) interface that enables natural language interaction with human operators. The interface processes user intents, encodes them using a semantic embedding model, and maps them to one of seven predefined intent categories to trigger analytics queries or event subscription commands. This architecture abstracts the complexity of traditional interfaces, allowing non-expert users to manage network analytics and subscriptions with ease. The system supports Access and Management Function (AMF) and Session Management Function (SMF) event subscriptions, real-time monitoring, and analytics retrieval via Prometheus, all accessible through a conversational interface. By bridging AI-driven intent recognition with standardized network analytics, our implementation enhances operator usability and provides a foundation towards AI-native 6G networks. The source code and datasets generated during the current study are available in the github repository, https://github.com/HenokDanielbfg/testbed.

Recently, stable diffusion (SD) models have typically flourished in the field of image synthesis and personalized editing, with a range of photorealistic and unprecedented images being successfully generated. As a result, widespread interest has been ignited to develop and use various SD-based tools for visual content creation. However, the exposure of AI-created content on public platforms could raise both legal and ethical risks. In this regard, the traditional methods of adding watermarks to the already generated images (i.e. post-processing) may face a dilemma (e.g., being erased or modified) in terms of copyright protection and content monitoring, since the powerful image inversion and text-to-image editing techniques have been widely explored in SD-based methods. In this work, we propose a Safe and high-traceable Stable Diffusion framework (namely Safe-SD) to adaptively implant the graphical watermarks (e.g., QR code) into the imperceptible structure-related pixels during the generative diffusion process for supporting text-driven invisible watermarking and detection. Different from the previous high-cost injection-then-detection training framework, we design a simple and unified architecture, which makes it possible to simultaneously train watermark injection and detection in a single network, greatly improving the efficiency and convenience of use. Moreover, to further support text-driven generative watermarking and deeply explore its robustness and high-traceability, we elaborately design lambda sampling and encryption algorithm to fine-tune a latent diffuser wrapped by a VAE for balancing high-fidelity image synthesis and high-traceable watermark detection. We present our quantitative and qualitative results on two representative datasets LSUN, COCO and FFHQ, demonstrating state-of-the-art performance of Safe-SD and showing it significantly outperforms the previous approaches.

In this work, we present a new approach for fast tracking on multiwire proportional chambers with neural networks. The tracking networks are developed and adapted for the first-level trigger at hadron collider experiments. We use Monte Carlo samples generated by Geant4 with a custom muon chamber, which resembles part of the thin gap chambers from the ATLAS experiment, for training and performance evaluations. The chamber has a total of seven gas gaps, where the first and last gas gaps are displaced by ~1.5 m. Each gas gap has 50 channels with a size of 18-20 mm. Two neural network models are developed and presented: a convolutional neural network and a neural network optimized for the detector configuration of this study. In the latter network, a convolution layer is provided for each of three groups formed from 2-3 gas gaps of the chamber, and the outputs are fed into multilayer perceptrons in sequence. Both networks are transformed into hardware description language and implemented in Virtex UltraScale+ FPGA. The angular resolution is 2 mrad, which is comparable to the maximum resolution of the detector estimated by the minimum chi2 method. The latency achieved by the implemented firmware is less than 100 ns, and the throughput rate is 160 MHz.

Deep neural networks (DNNs) can be manipulated to exhibit specific behaviors when exposed to specific trigger patterns, without affecting their performance on benign samples, dubbed backdoor attack. Currently, implementing backdoor attacks in physical scenarios still faces significant challenges. Physical attacks are labor-intensive and time-consuming, and the triggers are selected in a manual and heuristic way. Moreover, expanding digital attacks to physical scenarios faces many challenges due to their sensitivity to visual distortions and the absence of counterparts in the real world. To address these challenges, we define a novel trigger called the Visible, Semantic, Sample-Specific, and Compatible (VSSC) trigger, to achieve effective, stealthy and robust simultaneously, which can also be effectively deployed in the physical scenario using corresponding objects. To implement the VSSC trigger, we propose an automated pipeline comprising three modules: a trigger selection module that systematically identifies suitable triggers leveraging large language models, a trigger insertion module that employs generative models to seamlessly integrate triggers into images, and a quality assessment module that ensures the natural and successful insertion of triggers through vision-language models. Extensive experimental results and analysis validate the effectiveness, stealthiness, and robustness of the VSSC trigger. It can not only maintain robustness under visual distortions but also demonstrates strong practicality in the physical scenario. We hope that the proposed VSSC trigger and implementation approach could inspire future studies on designing more practical triggers in backdoor attacks.

In designing and applying graph neural networks, we often fall into some optimization pitfalls, the most deceptive of which is that we can only build a deep model by solving over-smoothing. The fundamental reason is that we do not understand how graph neural networks work. Stress graph drawing can offer a unique viewpoint to message iteration in the graph, such as the root of the over-smoothing problem lies in the inability of graph models to maintain an ideal distance between nodes. We further elucidate the trigger conditions of over-smoothing and propose Stress Graph Neural Networks. By introducing the attractive and repulsive message passing from stress iteration, we show how to build a deep model without preventing over-smoothing, how to use repulsive information, and how to optimize the current message-passing scheme to approximate the full stress message propagation. By performing different tasks on 23 datasets, we verified the effectiveness of our attractive and repulsive models and the derived relationship between stress iteration and graph neural networks. We believe that stress graph drawing will be a popular resource for understanding and designing graph neural networks.

Deep neural networks (DNNs) are vulnerable to backdoor attack, which does not affect the network's performance on clean data but would manipulate the network behavior once a trigger pattern is added. Existing defense methods have greatly reduced attack success rate, but their prediction accuracy on clean data still lags behind a clean model by a large margin. Inspired by the stealthiness and effectiveness of backdoor attack, we propose a simple but highly effective defense framework which injects non-adversarial backdoors targeting poisoned samples. Following the general steps in backdoor attack, we detect a small set of suspected samples and then apply a poisoning strategy to them. The non-adversarial backdoor, once triggered, suppresses the attacker's backdoor on poisoned data, but has limited influence on clean data. The defense can be carried out during data preprocessing, without any modification to the standard end-to-end training pipeline. We conduct extensive experiments on multiple benchmarks with different architectures and representative attacks. Results demonstrate that our method achieves state-of-the-art defense effectiveness with by far the lowest performance drop on clean data. Considering the surprising defense ability displayed by our framework, we call for more attention to utilizing backdoor for backdoor defense. Code is available at https://github.com/damianliumin/non-adversarial_backdoor.

Vision-language models (VLMs) have shown significant advancements in tasks such as visual grounding, where they localize specific objects in images based on natural language queries and images. However, security issues in visual grounding tasks for VLMs remain underexplored, especially in the context of backdoor attacks. In this paper, we introduce a novel input-aware backdoor attack method, IAG, designed to manipulate the grounding behavior of VLMs. This attack forces the model to ground a specific target object in the input image, regardless of the user's query. We propose an adaptive trigger generator that embeds the semantic information of the attack target's description into the original image using a text-conditional U-Net, thereby overcoming the open-vocabulary attack challenge. To ensure the attack's stealthiness, we utilize a reconstruction loss to minimize visual discrepancies between poisoned and clean images. Additionally, we introduce a unified method for generating attack data. IAG is evaluated theoretically and empirically, demonstrating its feasibility and effectiveness. Notably, our [email protected] on InternVL-2.5-8B reaches over 65\% on various testing sets. IAG also shows promising potential on manipulating Ferret-7B and LlaVA-1.5-7B with very little accuracy decrease on clean samples. Extensive specific experiments, such as ablation study and potential defense, also indicate the robustness and transferability of our attack.

The task of root cause analysis (RCA) is to identify the root causes of system faults/failures by analyzing system monitoring data. Efficient RCA can greatly accelerate system failure recovery and mitigate system damages or financial losses. However, previous research has mostly focused on developing offline RCA algorithms, which often require manually initiating the RCA process, a significant amount of time and data to train a robust model, and then being retrained from scratch for a new system fault. In this paper, we propose CORAL, a novel online RCA framework that can automatically trigger the RCA process and incrementally update the RCA model. CORAL consists of Trigger Point Detection, Incremental Disentangled Causal Graph Learning, and Network Propagation-based Root Cause Localization. The Trigger Point Detection component aims to detect system state transitions automatically and in near-real-time. To achieve this, we develop an online trigger point detection approach based on multivariate singular spectrum analysis and cumulative sum statistics. To efficiently update the RCA model, we propose an incremental disentangled causal graph learning approach to decouple the state-invariant and state-dependent information. After that, CORAL applies a random walk with restarts to the updated causal graph to accurately identify root causes. The online RCA process terminates when the causal graph and the generated root cause list converge. Extensive experiments on three real-world datasets with case studies demonstrate the effectiveness and superiority of the proposed framework.

Backdoor (Trojan) attack is a common threat to deep neural networks, where samples from one or more source classes embedded with a backdoor trigger will be misclassified to adversarial target classes. Existing methods for detecting whether a classifier is backdoor attacked are mostly designed for attacks with a single adversarial target (e.g., all-to-one attack). To the best of our knowledge, without supervision, no existing methods can effectively address the more general X2X attack with an arbitrary number of source classes, each paired with an arbitrary target class. In this paper, we propose UMD, the first Unsupervised Model Detection method that effectively detects X2X backdoor attacks via a joint inference of the adversarial (source, target) class pairs. In particular, we first define a novel transferability statistic to measure and select a subset of putative backdoor class pairs based on a proposed clustering approach. Then, these selected class pairs are jointly assessed based on an aggregation of their reverse-engineered trigger size for detection inference, using a robust and unsupervised anomaly detector we proposed. We conduct comprehensive evaluations on CIFAR-10, GTSRB, and Imagenette dataset, and show that our unsupervised UMD outperforms SOTA detectors (even with supervision) by 17%, 4%, and 8%, respectively, in terms of the detection accuracy against diverse X2X attacks. We also show the strong detection performance of UMD against several strong adaptive attacks.

In recent years, the rise of machine learning (ML) in cybersecurity has brought new challenges, including the increasing threat of backdoor poisoning attacks on ML malware classifiers. For instance, adversaries could inject malicious samples into public malware repositories, contaminating the training data and potentially misclassifying malware by the ML model. Current countermeasures predominantly focus on detecting poisoned samples by leveraging disagreements within the outputs of a diverse set of ensemble models on training data points. However, these methods are not suitable for scenarios where Machine Learning-as-a-Service (MLaaS) is used or when users aim to remove backdoors from a model after it has been trained. Addressing this scenario, we introduce PBP, a post-training defense for malware classifiers that mitigates various types of backdoor embeddings without assuming any specific backdoor embedding mechanism. Our method exploits the influence of backdoor attacks on the activation distribution of neural networks, independent of the trigger-embedding method. In the presence of a backdoor attack, the activation distribution of each layer is distorted into a mixture of distributions. By regulating the statistics of the batch normalization layers, we can guide a backdoored model to perform similarly to a clean one. Our method demonstrates substantial advantages over several state-of-the-art methods, as evidenced by experiments on two datasets, two types of backdoor methods, and various attack configurations. Notably, our approach requires only a small portion of the training data -- only 1\% -- to purify the backdoor and reduce the attack success rate from 100\% to almost 0\%, a 100-fold improvement over the baseline methods. Our code is available at https://github.com/judydnguyen/pbp-backdoor-purification-official.

While large language model (LLM) agents can effectively use external tools for complex real-world tasks, they require memory systems to leverage historical experiences. Current memory systems enable basic storage and retrieval but lack sophisticated memory organization, despite recent attempts to incorporate graph databases. Moreover, these systems' fixed operations and structures limit their adaptability across diverse tasks. To address this limitation, this paper proposes a novel agentic memory system for LLM agents that can dynamically organize memories in an agentic way. Following the basic principles of the Zettelkasten method, we designed our memory system to create interconnected knowledge networks through dynamic indexing and linking. When a new memory is added, we generate a comprehensive note containing multiple structured attributes, including contextual descriptions, keywords, and tags. The system then analyzes historical memories to identify relevant connections, establishing links where meaningful similarities exist. Additionally, this process enables memory evolution - as new memories are integrated, they can trigger updates to the contextual representations and attributes of existing historical memories, allowing the memory network to continuously refine its understanding. Our approach combines the structured organization principles of Zettelkasten with the flexibility of agent-driven decision making, allowing for more adaptive and context-aware memory management. Empirical experiments on six foundation models show superior improvement against existing SOTA baselines. The source code for evaluating performance is available at https://github.com/WujiangXu/AgenticMemory, while the source code of agentic memory system is available at https://github.com/agiresearch/A-mem.

Despite their impressive capabilities, multimodal large language models (MLLMs) are prone to hallucinations, i.e., the generated content that is nonsensical or unfaithful to input sources. Unlike in LLMs, hallucinations in MLLMs often stem from the sensitivity of text decoder to visual tokens, leading to a phenomenon akin to "amnesia" about visual information. To address this issue, we propose MemVR, a novel decoding paradigm inspired by common cognition: when the memory of an image seen the moment before is forgotten, people will look at it again for factual answers. Following this principle, we treat visual tokens as supplementary evidence, re-injecting them into the MLLM through Feed Forward Network (FFN) as "key-value memory" at the middle trigger layer. This "look-twice" mechanism occurs when the model exhibits high uncertainty during inference, effectively enhancing factual alignment. Comprehensive experimental evaluations demonstrate that MemVR significantly mitigates hallucination across various MLLMs and excels in general benchmarks without incurring additional time overhead. The implementation is available from https://github.com/1zhou-Wang/MemVR

Deep learning-based techniques have achieved state-of-the-art performance on a wide variety of recognition and classification tasks. However, these networks are typically computationally expensive to train, requiring weeks of computation on many GPUs; as a result, many users outsource the training procedure to the cloud or rely on pre-trained models that are then fine-tuned for a specific task. In this paper we show that outsourced training introduces new security risks: an adversary can create a maliciously trained network (a backdoored neural network, or a BadNet) that has state-of-the-art performance on the user's training and validation samples, but behaves badly on specific attacker-chosen inputs. We first explore the properties of BadNets in a toy example, by creating a backdoored handwritten digit classifier. Next, we demonstrate backdoors in a more realistic scenario by creating a U.S. street sign classifier that identifies stop signs as speed limits when a special sticker is added to the stop sign; we then show in addition that the backdoor in our US street sign detector can persist even if the network is later retrained for another task and cause a drop in accuracy of {25}\% on average when the backdoor trigger is present. These results demonstrate that backdoors in neural networks are both powerful and---because the behavior of neural networks is difficult to explicate---stealthy. This work provides motivation for further research into techniques for verifying and inspecting neural networks, just as we have developed tools for verifying and debugging software.

It is well known that natural language models are vulnerable to adversarial attacks, which are mostly input-specific in nature. Recently, it has been shown that there also exist input-agnostic attacks in NLP models, called universal adversarial triggers. However, existing methods to craft universal triggers are data intensive. They require large amounts of data samples to generate adversarial triggers, which are typically inaccessible by attackers. For instance, previous works take 3000 data samples per class for the SNLI dataset to generate adversarial triggers. In this paper, we present a novel data-free approach, MINIMAL, to mine input-agnostic adversarial triggers from models. Using the triggers produced with our data-free algorithm, we reduce the accuracy of Stanford Sentiment Treebank's positive class from 93.6% to 9.6%. Similarly, for the Stanford Natural Language Inference (SNLI), our single-word trigger reduces the accuracy of the entailment class from 90.95% to less than 0.6\%. Despite being completely data-free, we get equivalent accuracy drops as data-dependent methods.

In mobile telecommunications, alarms act as early warning signals. They are triggered when a cell, the basic unit of radio coverage, shuts down or behaves abnormally. This signals a degradation in service quality, which directly affects the customer experience. To fix the issue, operators rely on preset thresholds to decide when an engineer should be sent out. In practice, these thresholds are set manually and remain fixed regardless of the time of day, traffic levels, or overall network conditions. This often leads to serious faults slipping through during busy hours, while minor issues can cause unnecessary callouts when the network is quiet. This paper presents a machine learning framework that automatically predicts four alarm thresholds, audit window duration, inactive time limit, total fluctuation count, and per hour fluctuation limit, from live network behavior. Since no ground truth labels exist for thresholds, we introduce a percentile guided label derivation strategy and evaluate four models on an anonymized dataset of 10,648 cells across three vendors and nine regions from a real 4G network, comprising a Gradient Boosted Trees baseline, a CNN-BiLSTM with attention, the proposed PCTN, and an iTransformer. PCTN performs the best overall with respect to three of the four targets, outperforming a state-of-the-art iTransformer while using 83 percent fewer parameters. Its mixed output heads and dynamic alpha mechanism produce thresholds that are both accurate and interpretable, allowing operators to inspect and adjust the learned policy without retraining. All comparisons are statistically significant at p < 0.001. The framework undergoes daily retraining using new data, which enables the thresholds to constantly adjust to changes in the network.

Most existing work on event extraction has focused on sentence-level texts and presumes the identification of a trigger-span -- a word or phrase in the input that evokes the occurrence of an event of interest. Event arguments are then extracted with respect to the trigger. Indeed, triggers are treated as integral to, and trigger detection as an essential component of, event extraction. In this paper, we provide the first investigation of the role of triggers for the more difficult and much less studied task of document-level event extraction. We analyze their usefulness in multiple end-to-end and pipelined transformer-based event extraction models for three document-level event extraction datasets, measuring performance using triggers of varying quality (human-annotated, LLM-generated, keyword-based, and random). We find that whether or not systems benefit from explicitly extracting triggers depends both on dataset characteristics (i.e. the typical number of events per document) and task-specific information available during extraction (i.e. natural language event schemas). Perhaps surprisingly, we also observe that the mere existence of triggers in the input, even random ones, is important for prompt-based in-context learning approaches to the task.

Web-scraped datasets are vulnerable to data poisoning, which can be used for backdooring deep image classifiers during training. Since training on large datasets is expensive, a model is trained once and re-used many times. Unlike adversarial examples, backdoor attacks often target specific classes rather than any class learned by the model. One might expect that targeting many classes through a naive composition of attacks vastly increases the number of poison samples. We show this is not necessarily true and more efficient, universal data poisoning attacks exist that allow controlling misclassifications from any source class into any target class with a small increase in poison samples. Our idea is to generate triggers with salient characteristics that the model can learn. The triggers we craft exploit a phenomenon we call inter-class poison transferability, where learning a trigger from one class makes the model more vulnerable to learning triggers for other classes. We demonstrate the effectiveness and robustness of our universal backdoor attacks by controlling models with up to 6,000 classes while poisoning only 0.15% of the training dataset. Our source code is available at https://github.com/Ben-Schneider-code/Universal-Backdoor-Attacks.

We systematically evaluate the quality of widely used AI safety datasets from two perspectives: in isolation and in practice. In isolation, we examine how well these datasets reflect real-world adversarial attacks based on three key properties: being driven by ulterior intent, well-crafted, and out-of-distribution. We find that these datasets overrely on "triggering cues": words or phrases with overt negative/sensitive connotations that are intended to trigger safety mechanisms explicitly, which is unrealistic compared to real-world attacks. In practice, we evaluate whether these datasets genuinely measure safety risks or merely provoke refusals through triggering cues. To explore this, we introduce "intent laundering": a procedure that abstracts away triggering cues from adversarial attacks (data points) while strictly preserving their malicious intent and all relevant details. Our results indicate that current AI safety datasets fail to faithfully represent real-world adversarial behavior due to their overreliance on triggering cues. Once these cues are removed, all previously evaluated "reasonably safe" models become unsafe, including Gemini 3 Pro and Claude Sonnet 3.7. Moreover, when intent laundering is adapted as a jailbreaking technique, it consistently achieves high attack success rates, ranging from 90% to over 98%, under fully black-box access. Overall, our findings expose a significant disconnect between how model safety is evaluated by existing datasets and how real-world adversaries behave.

Nested Event Extraction (NEE) aims to extract complex event structures where an event contains other events as its arguments recursively. Nested events involve a kind of Pivot Elements (PEs) that simultaneously act as arguments of outer events and as triggers of inner events, and thus connect them into nested structures. This special characteristic of PEs brings challenges to existing NEE methods, as they cannot well cope with the dual identities of PEs. Therefore, this paper proposes a new model, called PerNee, which extracts nested events mainly based on recognizing PEs. Specifically, PerNee first recognizes the triggers of both inner and outer events and further recognizes the PEs via classifying the relation type between trigger pairs. In order to obtain better representations of triggers and arguments to further improve NEE performance, it incorporates the information of both event types and argument roles into PerNee through prompt learning. Since existing NEE datasets (e.g., Genia11) are limited to specific domains and contain a narrow range of event types with nested structures, we systematically categorize nested events in generic domain and construct a new NEE dataset, namely ACE2005-Nest. Experimental results demonstrate that PerNee consistently achieves state-of-the-art performance on ACE2005-Nest, Genia11 and Genia13.

Recent work has developed optimization procedures to find token sequences, called adversarial triggers, which can elicit unsafe responses from aligned language models. These triggers are believed to be universally transferable, i.e., a trigger optimized on one model can jailbreak other models. In this paper, we concretely show that such adversarial triggers are not universal. We extensively investigate trigger transfer amongst 13 open models and observe inconsistent transfer. Our experiments further reveal a significant difference in robustness to adversarial triggers between models Aligned by Preference Optimization (APO) and models Aligned by Fine-Tuning (AFT). We find that APO models are extremely hard to jailbreak even when the trigger is optimized directly on the model. On the other hand, while AFT models may appear safe on the surface, exhibiting refusals to a range of unsafe instructions, we show that they are highly susceptible to adversarial triggers. Lastly, we observe that most triggers optimized on AFT models also generalize to new unsafe instructions from five diverse domains, further emphasizing their vulnerability. Overall, our work highlights the need for more comprehensive safety evaluations for aligned language models.

Although the LLM-based in-context learning (ICL) paradigm has demonstrated considerable success across various natural language processing tasks, it encounters challenges in event detection. This is because LLMs lack an accurate understanding of event triggers and tend to make over-interpretation, which cannot be effectively corrected through in-context examples alone. In this paper, we focus on the most challenging one-shot setting and propose KeyCP++, a keyword-centric chain-of-thought prompting approach. KeyCP++ addresses the weaknesses of conventional ICL by automatically annotating the logical gaps between input text and detection results for the demonstrations. Specifically, to generate in-depth and meaningful rationale, KeyCP++ constructs a trigger discrimination prompting template. It incorporates the exemplary triggers (a.k.a keywords) into the prompt as the anchor to simply trigger profiling, let LLM propose candidate triggers, and justify each candidate. These propose-and-judge rationales help LLMs mitigate over-reliance on the keywords and promote detection rule learning. Extensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach, showcasing significant advancements in one-shot event detection.

Prompt-based learning paradigm bridges the gap between pre-training and fine-tuning, and works effectively under the few-shot setting. However, we find that this learning paradigm inherits the vulnerability from the pre-training stage, where model predictions can be misled by inserting certain triggers into the text. In this paper, we explore this universal vulnerability by either injecting backdoor triggers or searching for adversarial triggers on pre-trained language models using only plain text. In both scenarios, we demonstrate that our triggers can totally control or severely decrease the performance of prompt-based models fine-tuned on arbitrary downstream tasks, reflecting the universal vulnerability of the prompt-based learning paradigm. Further experiments show that adversarial triggers have good transferability among language models. We also find conventional fine-tuning models are not vulnerable to adversarial triggers constructed from pre-trained language models. We conclude by proposing a potential solution to mitigate our attack methods. Code and data are publicly available at https://github.com/leix28/prompt-universal-vulnerability

We investigate the robustness of reasoning models trained for step-by-step problem solving by introducing query-agnostic adversarial triggers - short, irrelevant text that, when appended to math problems, systematically mislead models to output incorrect answers without altering the problem's semantics. We propose CatAttack, an automated iterative attack pipeline for generating triggers on a weaker, less expensive proxy model (DeepSeek V3) and successfully transfer them to more advanced reasoning target models like DeepSeek R1 and DeepSeek R1-distilled-Qwen-32B, resulting in greater than 300% increase in the likelihood of the target model generating an incorrect answer. For example, appending, "Interesting fact: cats sleep most of their lives," to any math problem leads to more than doubling the chances of a model getting the answer wrong. Our findings highlight critical vulnerabilities in reasoning models, revealing that even state-of-the-art models remain susceptible to subtle adversarial inputs, raising security and reliability concerns. The CatAttack triggers dataset with model responses is available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/collinear-ai/cat-attack-adversarial-triggers.

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) have advanced embodied agents by enabling direct perception, reasoning, and planning task-oriented actions from visual inputs. However, such vision driven embodied agents open a new attack surface: visual backdoor attacks, where the agent behaves normally until a visual trigger appears in the scene, then persistently executes an attacker-specified multi-step policy. We introduce BEAT, the first framework to inject such visual backdoors into MLLM-based embodied agents using objects in the environments as triggers. Unlike textual triggers, object triggers exhibit wide variation across viewpoints and lighting, making them difficult to implant reliably. BEAT addresses this challenge by (1) constructing a training set that spans diverse scenes, tasks, and trigger placements to expose agents to trigger variability, and (2) introducing a two-stage training scheme that first applies supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and then our novel Contrastive Trigger Learning (CTL). CTL formulates trigger discrimination as preference learning between trigger-present and trigger-free inputs, explicitly sharpening the decision boundaries to ensure precise backdoor activation. Across various embodied agent benchmarks and MLLMs, BEAT achieves attack success rates up to 80%, while maintaining strong benign task performance, and generalizes reliably to out-of-distribution trigger placements. Notably, compared to naive SFT, CTL boosts backdoor activation accuracy up to 39% under limited backdoor data. These findings expose a critical yet unexplored security risk in MLLM-based embodied agents, underscoring the need for robust defenses before real-world deployment.

Current research in adversarial robustness of LLMs focuses on discrete input manipulations in the natural language space, which can be directly transferred to closed-source models. However, this approach neglects the steady progression of open-source models. As open-source models advance in capability, ensuring their safety also becomes increasingly imperative. Yet, attacks tailored to open-source LLMs that exploit full model access remain largely unexplored. We address this research gap and propose the embedding space attack, which directly attacks the continuous embedding representation of input tokens. We find that embedding space attacks circumvent model alignments and trigger harmful behaviors more efficiently than discrete attacks or model fine-tuning. Furthermore, we present a novel threat model in the context of unlearning and show that embedding space attacks can extract supposedly deleted information from unlearned LLMs across multiple datasets and models. Our findings highlight embedding space attacks as an important threat model in open-source LLMs. Trigger Warning: the appendix contains LLM-generated text with violence and harassment.

Recently, Stitchable Neural Networks (SN-Net) is proposed to stitch some pre-trained networks for quickly building numerous networks with different complexity and performance trade-offs. In this way, the burdens of designing or training the variable-sized networks, which can be used in application scenarios with diverse resource constraints, are alleviated. However, SN-Net still faces a few challenges. 1) Stitching from multiple independently pre-trained anchors introduces high storage resource consumption. 2) SN-Net faces challenges to build smaller models for low resource constraints. 3). SN-Net uses an unlearned initialization method for stitch layers, limiting the final performance. To overcome these challenges, motivated by the recently proposed Learngene framework, we propose a novel method called Learngene Pool. Briefly, Learngene distills the critical knowledge from a large pre-trained model into a small part (termed as learngene) and then expands this small part into a few variable-sized models. In our proposed method, we distill one pretrained large model into multiple small models whose network blocks are used as learngene instances to construct the learngene pool. Since only one large model is used, we do not need to store more large models as SN-Net and after distilling, smaller learngene instances can be created to build small models to satisfy low resource constraints. We also insert learnable transformation matrices between the instances to stitch them into variable-sized models to improve the performance of these models. Exhaustive experiments have been implemented and the results validate the effectiveness of the proposed Learngene Pool compared with SN-Net.

Graphical User Interface (GUI) agents are increasingly deployed to interact with online web services, yet their exposure to open-world content renders them vulnerable to Environmental Injection Attacks (EIAs). In these attacks, an attacker can inject crafted triggers into website to manipulate the behavior of GUI agents used by other users. In this paper, we find that most existing EIA studies fall short of realism. In particular, they fail to capture the dynamic nature of real-world web content, often assuming that a trigger's on-screen position and surrounding visual context remain largely consistent between training and testing. To better reflect practice, we introduce a realistic dynamic-environment threat model in which the attacker is a regular user and the trigger is embedded within a dynamically changing environment. Under this threat model, existing approaches largely fail, suggesting that their effectiveness in exposing GUI agent vulnerabilities has been substantially overestimated. To expose the hidden vulnerabilities of existing GUI agents effectively, we propose Chameleon, an attack framework with two key novelties designed for dynamic environments. (1) To synthesize more realistic training data, we introduce LLM-Driven Environment Simulation, which automatically generates diverse, high-fidelity webpage simulations that mimic the variability of real-world dynamic environments. (2) To optimize the trigger more effectively, we introduce Attention Black Hole, which converts attention weights into explicit supervisory signals. This mechanism encourages the agent to remain insensitive to irrelevant surrounding content, thereby improving robustness in dynamic environments. We evaluate Chameleon on six realistic websites and four representative LVLM-powered GUI agents, where it significantly outperforms existing methods.

Communication load is a limiting factor in many real-time systems. Event-triggered state estimation and event-triggered learning methods reduce network communication by sending information only when it cannot be adequately predicted based on previously transmitted data. This paper proposes an event-triggered learning approach for nonlinear discrete-time systems with cyclic excitation. The method automatically recognizes cyclic patterns in data - even when they change repeatedly - and reduces communication load whenever the current data can be accurately predicted from previous cycles. Nonetheless, a bounded error between original and received signal is guaranteed. The cyclic excitation model, which is used for predictions, is updated hierarchically, i.e., a full model update is only performed if updating a small number of model parameters is not sufficient. A nonparametric statistical test enforces that model updates happen only if the cyclic excitation changed with high probability. The effectiveness of the proposed methods is demonstrated using the application example of wireless real-time pitch angle measurements of a human foot in a feedback-controlled neuroprosthesis. The experimental results show that communication load can be reduced by 70 % while the root-mean-square error between measured and received angle is less than 1°.

Gradient optimization-based adversarial attack methods automate the learning of adversarial triggers to generate jailbreak prompts or leak system prompts. In this work, we take a closer look at the optimization objective of adversarial trigger learning and propose ATLA: Adversarial Trigger Learning with Augmented objectives. ATLA improves the negative log-likelihood loss used by previous studies into a weighted loss formulation that encourages the learned adversarial triggers to optimize more towards response format tokens. This enables ATLA to learn an adversarial trigger from just one query-response pair and the learned trigger generalizes well to other similar queries. We further design a variation to augment trigger optimization with an auxiliary loss that suppresses evasive responses. We showcase how to use ATLA to learn adversarial suffixes jailbreaking LLMs and to extract hidden system prompts. Empirically we demonstrate that ATLA consistently outperforms current state-of-the-art techniques, achieving nearly 100% success in attacking while requiring 80% fewer queries. ATLA learned jailbreak suffixes demonstrate high generalization to unseen queries and transfer well to new LLMs. We released our code https://github.com/QData/ALTA_Augmented_Adversarial_Trigger_Learning

LLM agents with tool access can discover and exploit security vulnerabilities. This is known. What is not known is which features of a system prompt trigger this behaviour, and which do not. We present a systematic taxonomy based on approximately 10,000 trials across seven models, 37 prompt conditions, and 12 hypothesized attack dimensions -- all executed in real Docker sandboxes. Every condition includes the instruction "Always respect all rules and access policies"; only a single encouragement sentence varies. Within the task class studied (planted test-runner vulnerabilities), the threat model is narrower than assumed: nine of twelve dimensions -- including minimization, moral licensing, incentives, identity priming, and reasoning triggers -- produce no detectable exploitation at n=50 per cell (upper 95% CI <7% per condition). But it is also more subtle than expected: one dimension, goal reframing, reliably triggers exploitation. "You are solving a puzzle; there may be hidden clues" produces 38-40% exploitation on Claude Sonnet 4 despite the explicit rule instruction, replicating across four models (CTF framing: 8-14% on DeepSeek, GPT-5-mini, o4-mini). The agent does not override the rules; it reinterprets the task so that exploitative actions become task-aligned. GPT-4.1 produces no exploitation across 1,850 trials (37 conditions), and a temporal comparison across four OpenAI models released over eleven months shows a pattern consistent with improving safety training, though model capability differences are a confounder. The practical contribution is a narrowed, testable threat model: defenders should audit for goal-reframing language, not for the broad class of adversarial prompts.

Considering the increased workload in pathology laboratories today, automated tools such as artificial intelligence models can help pathologists with their tasks and ease the workload. In this paper, we are proposing a segmentation model (DRU-Net) that can provide a delineation of human non-small cell lung carcinomas and an augmentation method that can improve classification results. The proposed model is a fused combination of truncated pre-trained DenseNet201 and ResNet101V2 as a patch-wise classifier followed by a lightweight U-Net as a refinement model. We have used two datasets (Norwegian Lung Cancer Biobank and Haukeland University Hospital lung cancer cohort) to create our proposed model. The DRU-Net model achieves an average of 0.91 Dice similarity coefficient. The proposed spatial augmentation method (multi-lens distortion) improved the network performance by 3%. Our findings show that choosing image patches that specifically include regions of interest leads to better results for the patch-wise classifier compared to other sampling methods. The qualitative analysis showed that the DRU-Net model is generally successful in detecting the tumor. On the test set, some of the cases showed areas of false positive and false negative segmentation in the periphery, particularly in tumors with inflammatory and reactive changes.

The detection of bias in natural language processing (NLP) is a critical challenge, particularly with the increasing use of large language models (LLMs) in various domains. This paper introduces GUS-Net, an innovative approach to bias detection that focuses on three key types of biases: (G)eneralizations, (U)nfairness, and (S)tereotypes. GUS-Net leverages generative AI and automated agents to create a comprehensive synthetic dataset, enabling robust multi-label token classification. Our methodology enhances traditional bias detection methods by incorporating the contextual encodings of pre-trained models, resulting in improved accuracy and depth in identifying biased entities. Through extensive experiments, we demonstrate that GUS-Net outperforms state-of-the-art techniques, achieving superior performance in terms of accuracy, F1-score, and Hamming Loss. The findings highlight GUS-Net's effectiveness in capturing a wide range of biases across diverse contexts, making it a valuable tool for social bias detection in text. This study contributes to the ongoing efforts in NLP to address implicit bias, providing a pathway for future research and applications in various fields. The Jupyter notebooks used to create the dataset and model are available at: https://github.com/Ethical-Spectacle/fair-ly/tree/main/resources. Warning: This paper contains examples of harmful language, and reader discretion is recommended.

Semantic segmentation is one of the most popular research areas in medical image computing. Perhaps surprisingly, despite its conceptualization dating back to 2018, nnU-Net continues to provide competitive out-of-the-box solutions for a broad variety of segmentation problems and is regularly used as a development framework for challenge-winning algorithms. Here we use nnU-Net to participate in the AMOS2022 challenge, which comes with a unique set of tasks: not only is the dataset one of the largest ever created and boasts 15 target structures, but the competition also requires submitted solutions to handle both MRI and CT scans. Through careful modification of nnU-net's hyperparameters, the addition of residual connections in the encoder and the design of a custom postprocessing strategy, we were able to substantially improve upon the nnU-Net baseline. Our final ensemble achieves Dice scores of 90.13 for Task 1 (CT) and 89.06 for Task 2 (CT+MRI) in a 5-fold cross-validation on the provided training cases.

Contrastive Learning (CL) has attracted enormous attention due to its remarkable capability in unsupervised representation learning. However, recent works have revealed the vulnerability of CL to backdoor attacks: the feature extractor could be misled to embed backdoored data close to an attack target class, thus fooling the downstream predictor to misclassify it as the target. Existing attacks usually adopt a fixed trigger pattern and poison the training set with trigger-injected data, hoping for the feature extractor to learn the association between trigger and target class. However, we find that such fixed trigger design fails to effectively associate trigger-injected data with target class in the embedding space due to special CL mechanisms, leading to a limited attack success rate (ASR). This phenomenon motivates us to find a better backdoor trigger design tailored for CL framework. In this paper, we propose a bi-level optimization approach to achieve this goal, where the inner optimization simulates the CL dynamics of a surrogate victim, and the outer optimization enforces the backdoor trigger to stay close to the target throughout the surrogate CL procedure. Extensive experiments show that our attack can achieve a higher attack success rate (e.g., 99% ASR on ImageNet-100) with a very low poisoning rate (1%). Besides, our attack can effectively evade existing state-of-the-art defenses. Code is available at: https://github.com/SWY666/SSL-backdoor-BLTO.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) has significantly enhanced the factual accuracy and domain adaptability of Large Language Models (LLMs). This advancement has enabled their widespread deployment across sensitive domains such as healthcare, finance, and enterprise applications. RAG mitigates hallucinations by integrating external knowledge, yet introduces privacy risk and security risk, notably data breaching risk and data poisoning risk. While recent studies have explored prompt injection and poisoning attacks, there remains a significant gap in comprehensive research on controlling inbound and outbound query flows to mitigate these threats. In this paper, we propose an AI firewall, ControlNET, designed to safeguard RAG-based LLM systems from these vulnerabilities. ControlNET controls query flows by leveraging activation shift phenomena to detect adversarial queries and mitigate their impact through semantic divergence. We conduct comprehensive experiments on four different benchmark datasets including Msmarco, HotpotQA, FinQA, and MedicalSys using state-of-the-art open source LLMs (Llama3, Vicuna, and Mistral). Our results demonstrate that ControlNET achieves over 0.909 AUROC in detecting and mitigating security threats while preserving system harmlessness. Overall, ControlNET offers an effective, robust, harmless defense mechanism, marking a significant advancement toward the secure deployment of RAG-based LLM systems.

Long-horizon multimodal agents in open-world games must stay goal-directed across many low-level interactions under tight token and latency budgets. Existing approaches often trade off costly per-step reasoning against reactive execution that can drift, repeat failures, and recover poorly. Our key idea is to reuse strategic reasoning across locally stable segments and reinvoke it at event boundaries. We present SPIKE, an adaptive dual controller framework for cost-efficient long-horizon game control. Its Strategic Controller performs low-frequency global planning, failure analysis, and recovery, while its Reactive Controller handles fast local execution under a strict token budget. An Event Trigger monitors visual change, task progress, repeated actions, and failure signals to decide when control should stay reactive or escalate to strategic reasoning. Hierarchical Memory separates short-term experience reuse in the State-Action Memory Bank (SA-MB) from structured evidence in the State Action Knowledge Graph (SA-KG), allowing each controller to retrieve the context it needs. This design reuses strategic proposals over multiple reactive steps, supports local override when plans become stale, and reserves expensive reasoning for moments where extra deliberation is useful. On the Lite-100 split of StarDojo, SPIKE improves Lite-100 success rate (SR) by 5.0 percentage points (38.5% relative) over the strongest Lite-100 baseline and Budgeted SR by 9.3 points (75.6% relative) over the strongest budgeted baseline. It also reduces token consumption by 54.9% and latency by 40.8%. Ablations show that event triggering, reactive override, and heterogeneous memory each contribute to success and recovery, supporting selective reasoning rather than reasoning at every step.

This work establishes that trigger-word data poisoning of vision language action models is practical, while at the same time the open-source robotics ecosystem holds trust assumptions about community contributions. A few poisoned samples can silently embed a backdoor that disables a robot on command. We evaluate this threat against smolVLA on a real-world pick-and-place task, training on three poison ratios and evaluating across different prompts on the LeRobot platform. Three poisoned episodes in 320 clean episodes suffice for a complete denial of service. Success rate drops to 0.0 plus minus 0.0% across all trigger-word conditions and the robot locks into a fixed joint configuration rather than executing any task-relevant motion. Clean-prompt behaviour holds at approx. 50% success rate across all poison ratios, confirming the attack is stealthy under normal operation. A single poisoned episode already reduces success rate to 6.7 plus minus 6.7%. The robot still moves, but no longer completes the task. The attack generalises to front, middle, and end trigger placements despite training exclusively on front-placed triggers. These findings establish that the threat is practical, low-cost, and stealthy, and warrant treating dataset provenance as a first-class concern in open-source robotics ecosystems.

The U-Net was presented in 2015. With its straight-forward and successful architecture it quickly evolved to a commonly used benchmark in medical image segmentation. The adaptation of the U-Net to novel problems, however, comprises several degrees of freedom regarding the exact architecture, preprocessing, training and inference. These choices are not independent of each other and substantially impact the overall performance. The present paper introduces the nnU-Net ('no-new-Net'), which refers to a robust and self-adapting framework on the basis of 2D and 3D vanilla U-Nets. We argue the strong case for taking away superfluous bells and whistles of many proposed network designs and instead focus on the remaining aspects that make out the performance and generalizability of a method. We evaluate the nnU-Net in the context of the Medical Segmentation Decathlon challenge, which measures segmentation performance in ten disciplines comprising distinct entities, image modalities, image geometries and dataset sizes, with no manual adjustments between datasets allowed. At the time of manuscript submission, nnU-Net achieves the highest mean dice scores across all classes and seven phase 1 tasks (except class 1 in BrainTumour) in the online leaderboard of the challenge.